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Abstract
The development of prediction markets has naturally given rise to studies of their effi-
ciency. Most studies of efficiency in prediction markets have focused on the speed with
which they incorporate information. A necessary (but not sufficient) condition of effi-
ciency is that arbitrage opportunities must non-existent or transitory in nature so that
the systematic generation of abnormal profits is not possible. Using data from New
Zealand’s first prediction market, iPredict, I examine the potential for arbitrage in the
contracts for the party vote for the 2011 General Election. Relative to the risk-free inter-
est rate, the returns from arbitrage are generally low, consistent with an efficient market.
Regression analysis requires that the data not be subject to the possibility of spurious
regressions - something that is not addressed in the literature. After confirming the non-
stationarity of the price level and the stationarity of the price changes by the unit root
test, I use the iPredict data in conjunction with opinion poll data to test whether the
polls impact on market pricing behaviour. Using a number of different model types, I find
that the opinion poll data has a very limited impact on market prices, suggesting that
the information contained in the poll is largely already incorporated into market prices.

Chapter 1
Introduction
A prediction market is a relatively new form of financial market. The first prediction
market, the Iowa Electronic Market, (IEM) was developed in 1988 by three economists
at the Iowa College of Business. They ran an experimental market offering a place where
traders could buy or sell contracts which paid $1 if a given candidate won the U.S presi-
dential election in that year. Its purpose was to predict who would win the presidential
run. Since then prediction markets have become more and more sophisticated serving as
a prediction tool for both research and commercial purposes. Despite being controversial
in some applications, this new form of market has gradually gained public attention and
been recognized as a tool that can support decision making in many contexts including
political, economic and corporate. This thesis examines the efficiency of prediction mar-
kets in the context of data from the 2011 General Election in New Zealand.
1.1 Research problem and objectives
Due to the similarity in the operating mechanism with stock markets, the Efficient Mar-
ket Hypothesis (EMH), should also be applied to prediction markets. The EMH asserts
that in a perfectly efficient market "prices fully reflect all available information" (Fama,
1
1965b). As buyers and sellers interact in the market through trading activities they
reveal information they have about the value of the trading asset. During the trading
interaction, prices incorporate information relevant to the trading asset that buyers and
sellers possess. In an efficient market, the price is the best indicator of an asset’s value
and any information will be incorporated into prices as soon as it arrives.
Until the introduction of prediction markets, the revelation of an asset’s value depends
on the existence of a market on the relevant commodity. When the underlying asset is
not a "real" commodity, it is almost impossible to identify its value. This is the situation
where prediction market is most valuable. Where there is no futures market in the rele-
vant asset, for instance political outcomes, or markets in which trading on the relevant
asset is too thin, prediction markets can provide a vehicle for people to trade on relevant
information and become valuable means of informing market participants.
The ultimate purpose of a prediction market is to offer a vehicle to aggregate information.
One question that remains controversial is how efficient thee prediction market is as an
information aggregator and how well prices replicate the underlying event’s likelihood.
This is the objective of my research. I use data collected from iPredict - the first real
money prediction market in New Zealand. iPredict offers contracts to predict outcome of
many events in various contexts such as political events, economic indexes, environmental
issues, Fonterra’s payout etc.
The efficiency of prediction markets is examined in a few aspects. First, the primary
focus of this thesis and the necessary condition of market efficiency is no-arbitrage: when
the price is at the efficient level, the market is free from arbitrage opportunities; no
trading technique can create opportunities that can consistently earn abnormal and risk-
free returns. Prices in prediction markets have a distinguishable feature from those in
other financial markets which is that the aggregate price of contracts predicting various
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outcomes of a specific event represents 100%. This feature creates an unique arbitrage
opportunity when the aggregate price diverges from $1 or 100% probability. Second, I
examine the properties of the market price level, more specifically stationarity. Last, the
degree of market efficiency is reflected by how well prices incorporate information; in this
study it is how well prices incorporate information revealed in opinion polls - a direct
competitive forecast tool.
1.2 Structure of the thesis
Chapter 2 introduces prediction markets and their theoretical principles; together with
iPredict and its operating mechanism. and the 2011 New Zealand vote share prediction
market. The first section of Chapter 3 is a brief review of the extensive and vast literature
on the Efficient Market Hypothesis. The remainder of Chapter 3 summarizes the result
of studies on the efficiency of prediction markets. It includes studies comparing the per-
formance of a some particular prediction markets with their competitive forecasting tools
and studies on why prediction markets can be classified as having weak-form efficiency.
Chapter 4 investigates the degree of arbitrage possibility by testing the hypothesis that
the market is able to eliminate arbitrage opportunities and whether profit gained from
such arbitrage practices is sufficiently significant to indicate market inefficiency. A lit-
erature review is followed by a description of the condition for when arbitrage arises in
iPredict, and how to calculate the arbitrage profit. The last part reports empirical results.
The properties of market prices are studied in chapter 5. A literature review is followed by
a detailed description of the Unit Root test by which the stationary property of prices are
examined and then the reporting of the empirical results. Chapter 6 studies the effect of
opinion polls on market prices as an indicator of how well prices incorporate information
contained in polls. The first section discussed the differences in the forecast of prediction
3
markets and opinion polls - the two serve the same broad purpose but operate by different
principles therefore their forecast outcomes should be interpreted differently. The rela-
tionship between market prices and opinion polls will be examined by three models; each
derives from an alternative of the behaviour of market prices. The empirical results follow.
Chapter 7 concludes.
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Chapter 2
Prediction markets, iPredict and
2011 New Zealand Election markets
2.1 Prediction markets
Prediction markets are defined as markets that serve "the primary purpose of aggregating
information so that market prices forecast future events" (Berg and Rietz, 2003) and are
also known as idea markets, information markets, decision markets, electronic markets,
forecasting markets and virtual stock markets. A prediction market serves as a common
place where people trade contracts whose payoff depends on the outcome of an uncertain
future event. In an efficient prediction market, prices are the best predictor of the likeli-
hood of an event’s outcome.
Despite being a form of financial market, prediction markets distinguish themselves from
traditional financial markets in a few respects. First, prediction markets have a primary
purpose in research because its main purpose is to reveal and aggregate information dis-
persed among market participants. In contrast, stock and other financial markets serve
as tools to allocate resources, hedge risk and to raise capital. Second, there is no un-
derlying asset in prediction markets. In other financial markets assets are exchanged
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for money and thus prices indicates the value of those assets relative to others. These
markets, therefore, exist to offer a common place for traders to interact and transact and
prices play the role as a mechanism for the exchange to take place. Trading in prediction
market, in contrast, has no economic function where no real asset is exchanged. Market
participants trade according to their expectation of an event hence market prices reflect
the trader’s estimate of a specific parameter value of the underlying event (Abramowicz,
2007). The fact that prediction markets are not tied to real assets makes them unique.
Last, assets traded in prediction markets are contingent claims and contracts are tied to
a future event. The direct dependence of traders’ returns on an event, rather than other
traders’ expectations of outcomes, distinguishes prediction markets from most futures
and options markets (tet, 2008).
Prediction markets are often mistakenly perceived as a form of gambling or betting market
due to the similarities in their operating mechanism. Betting markets are mainly for
entertainment while prediction markets are a research tool. Betting markets do not
allow bettors to change their betting position once the bet is placed. If a bettor changes
his mind after placing a bid, it is not possible for him to correct his previous bid and
update his bet so that it matches with his most recent expectation1. This is a limit
preventing betting markets from reflecting real-time information. Prediction markets,
on the other hand, allow traders to change their trading position according to their
new expectation. The shift in trader’s expectation is mainly due to the arrival of new
information. Allowing traders to update their trading position at any time helps new
information to be incorporated into prices instantly.
1Thus a bettor cannot undertake an offsetting trade that leaves him in a net neutral position.
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2.2 iPredict and its trading mechanism
iPredict2 is New Zealand’s first and only real money political prediction market. iPredict
was established in 2008, shortly before the General Election that year, as a market-based
political and economic forecasting system. Today iPredict has over 5,000 traders, and has
launched over 1500 contracts. iPredict Ltd is owned by Victoria Link Ltd, or "Viclink",
the commercial arm of Victoria University of Wellington. It is authorized as a futures
dealer by the Financial Markets Authority. The iPredict market operates 24-hours a day.
Traders trade with their own funds in real money, and conduct their own information
search.
iPredict is an institution where traders make predictions and earn money by buying and
selling event’s futures. iPredict stocks work like a share market. Traders can buy stocks
in a future event today and sell them on the open market at any time in the future.
Or wait until they close and pay out. iPredict offers stocks in a range of events, and
set new stocks up frequently in response to political and economics events. Traders can
suggest new stock ideas (most of the stocks started with ideas from traders). iPredict
operates like a stock market where traders can buy stocks of a future event today and
sell them at any time in the future or wait until the maturity and receive the payout.
For instance, with regards to the General Election’s results in 2011, iPredict launched
a number of contracts three of which each of which paid out $1 per share if after the
2011 Election there was to be a National or Labour or non-National-and-Labour Prime
Minister respectively, and pay nothing otherwise. Those who were sure of a National
victory would buy as many shares of the National contract within his budget constraints.
By the act of buying National shares, the trader simultaneously gives a signal to other
traders that he expects National to win. Through this mechanism, prediction markets
exploit the "wisdom of crowds" (Surowiecki, 2004) to help predict the outcome of many
2http://www.ipredict.co.nz
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events that occur in the real world.
Trades in prediction markets happen in a variety of different market designs which defines
how buyers and sellers’ want match. They includes continuous double auctions (CDA),
implemented market-scoring rules (MSR), call auctions and dynamic pari-mutuel pools.
However, I will only discuss the MSR mechanism because it is adopted by iPredict.
The mechanism implementing MSR developed by Hanson (Hanson, 2003) acts like a mar-
ket maker which plays a role of both buyer and seller in order to provide the market with
liquidity. As soon as a trader places his order, the market maker will create a matched
order on the opposite side so that his order can be executed immediately. Implementing
MRS is most suitable in small and less liquid markets.
The market maker continually makes offers to buy and sell according to a price schedule
rule that is determined at the contract launch. With a market maker, the first trader
entering the market can immediately trade. Otherwise, he would arrive at an empty
queue and have to wait for others to enter and trade against him so that his orders will
be executed.
When a new market is set up, the market maker’s presence is obvious from the regular
pattern of seeding. Figure 2.1 provides an example of a seeding schedule. If a trader
wants to buy 150 shares, he will have to pay the price of $0.5 each for the first 100 shares
and $0.5167 each for the next 50 shares.
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Figure 2.1: An example of buy and sell offers in iPredict
 
The market maker is treated as a trader in the system. Each contract listed on iPredict
has one market maker automatically associated with it. The market maker is given a
budget, and that budget is consumed as the market maker buys and sells stocks. If the
budget is exhausted, then the market maker will stop seeding (or very substantially thin
its offers) on the side of the market that additional trading will cause erosion of its funds.
For instance, if the market maker low on funds and is long on its stock, it will thin or
eliminate entirely more offers to buy. The market maker loses money over the time3.
The market maker’s seeding operates according to three settings determined by the
iPredict’s administrator at the time a new contract is launched: an initial price defining
the price at which buy orders and sell orders begin, the market maker sensitivity deter-
mining the steepness of the S-curve and the batch size which is the number of stocks
offered at each price point.
The market maker prices all buy and sell offers using an S-curve (see Figure 2.2). The
formula for this S-curve is:
3On average, the market maker loses $186.50 in binary contracts, $25.15 on index contracts, and
$154.64 per market overall.
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pricei =
1
1 + e
i
sensitivity
where i is an integer that varies between −n to n, where n is defined by the value that
produces a price that is within 0.0001 of 0 and 1, the minimum and maximum prices. In
Figure 2.2, i varies along the horizontal axis. The sensitivity is within the range (0, 99].
The higher the sensitivity, the flatter the S-curve and the smaller the price gap between
each step in i.
Figure 2.2: Market maker price setting sensitivity
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Starting from an index i of 0, the system will increase i in steps of 1, at each step pricei is
calculated and permanently stored in an array. The integer i will increase until pricei is
within 0.0001 of 0. The process is then repeated, starting from 0, this time decrementing
the index by 1 at each step until pricei is within 0.0001 of 1. At this point, an entire
price schedule for this market maker is calculated, and all offers to buy and sell (unless
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market maker setting is changed) will be at prices defined by this schedule.
At all pricei above the start price, the offer will be on the sell side of the market, otherwise
the buy side. Once trading commences, the market maker seeds the market by replacing
completely-filled buy or sell offers with sell or buy offers at the same time. For instance,
a trader decides to accept in its entirety a market maker’s offer to buy 100 shares at
price $0.5. Once the buy offer is filled, the market marker will immediately place a new
sell offer at $0.5. The effect of this is to move the market equilibrium price downwards.
Market maker never trades with itself because at no time its buy and sell offers overlap.
All trades with the market maker have human traders on the other side. About 75% of all
trades on iPredict are between market maker and human and the remainder is between
two human traders. The market maker starts with zero stocks. This means the market
maker’s funds are depleted whichever way the market moves. When a stock launches, sell
orders offered by the market maker mean that the market maker takes a short position
on that stock when those orders are filled.
2.3 The 2011 New Zealand Vote Share Prediction
Market
The vote share market in iPredict provided forecasts of the proportion of total share of
votes a party would receive in the General Election in New Zealand in 2011. This market
had eight index contracts4, each paying 1 cent for each 1% of the total vote received
by the underlying party. The actual vote share determined the contract payout value.
Typically, a contract had a payout equal to 1 cent times the proportion of the total vote
received by the associated party. Details of the eight contracts are summarized in Table
2.1.
4Index contracts have pay-off depending on a number that rises or falls thus varies in a continuous way
(Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). The price for such contract represents the mean value that the market
assigns to the outcome.
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Table 2.1: Summary of the vote share market’s contracts
Contract name Contract’s predictive goal (Contract’s question) Payout (cents)
VOTE.2011.NAT What share of the party vote will the National Party win
,at the 2011 election?
47.31
VOTE.2011.LAB What share of the party vote will the Labour Party win
at the 2011 election?
27.48
VOTE.2011.GREEN What share of the party vote will the Green Party win
at the 2011 election?
11.06
VOTE.2011.NZF What share of the party vote will the New Zealand First
Party win at the 2011 election?
6.59
VOTE.2011.ACT What share of the party vote will the ACT Party win at
the 2011 election?
1.07
VOTE.2011.Ma¯ori What share of the party vote will the Ma¯ori Party win
at the 2011 election?
1.43
VOTE.2011.UNF What share of the party vote will the United Future Party
win at the 2011 election?
0.6
VOTE.2011.OTHER What share of the party vote will all other parties win at
the 2011 election?
4.461
1This contract pays $1 less the sum of payouts from VOTE.2011.NAT, VOTE.2011.LAB,
VOTE.2011.GREEN, VOTE.2011.NZF, VOTE.2011.ACT VOTE.2011.Ma¯ori and VOTE.2011.UNF.
In this market, prices are interpreted as the forecast of a party’s vote share (Wolfers and
Zitzewitz, 2006a). For instance, at 20:16:12pm on June 19, 2011 the (last traded) price of
contract VOTE.2011.NAT is 44.03 cents. This implies that the market expected National
Party would receive 44.03% of the total party vote at the 2011 General Election. Any
traders who believed that National Party would win more (or less) than 44.03% would
buy (or sell) shares until the contract price coincided with their expected level. The
official election results released on December 10, 2011 revealed that the National party
received 47.31% of the total party vote thus the contract VOTE.2011.NAT paid out 47.31
cents to every share held on its close date.
The vote share market was launched on November 2, 2010 and closed on December 10,
2011 after the official election results were released on the same day. The Election Day
was November 23, 2011; this means that trading continued operating after the Election
Day until the release of the official results. The market was running for 404 days. This
was a very liquid market compared to other markets run by iPredict; there were 33,258
transactions and 561,739 shares traded within its lifetime and 82 transactions and 1,390
12
shares per day on average. The total amount invested was $134,116.8 much higher than
that in the 2008 Election ($22,800 according to McGirr and Salmond (2010)). The sum-
mary of transactions and shares traded in each contract over the period of the contract
are given in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Summary of trading activity in the vote share market
Contract National Labour Green NZ
First
ACT Ma¯ori United
Future
Others Overall
Transactions 3,217 3,711 3,081 9,876 4,475 2,642 3,634 2,626 33,258
Shares traded 39,250 48,389 38,884 201,638 64,410 34,736 99,695 34,737 561,739
Transactions
per day
8 9 8 24 11 6 9 7 82
Shares per
day
97 112 96 500 160 86 247 86 1,390
Amount
(NZ$)
19,140 20,164 9,340 41,799 15,753 5,326 6.687 15.903 134,116
Because the trading fee of 0.35 cents per share trader was only introduced in August
2011, any transactions occurring before this were not subject to any trading fee. The
application of this fee does not appear to have any effect on the trading activity, more
specifically it did not discourage trading or reduce the amount of trades. Figure 2.3
shows no change in the number of transactions and shares traded after the trading fee
is applied. In fact, the trading volume increases significantly two months prior to the
Election’s results and this essentially is the result of an increase in the attention to the
Election5.
5There is a possibility that without the trading fee, trading would have been higher but there is noway
to prove or disprove it.
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Figure 2.3: The effect of transaction fee on trading activity
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The vote share market was set up to have greater liquidity (the sensitivity of 50 and
the batch size of 1) than other markets in iPredict. For instance, the markets predicting
OCR announcements6 are set up with the sensitivity of 15 (making for a steeper S-curve)
and the batch size at 10. Increasing the sensitivity of the S-curve reduces the difference
of two adjacent seeding prices. The smaller the difference, the more liquid the market is.
Each seeding price is associated with 10 shares, i.e. it requires purchase or sale at least
6iPredict has provided contracts for predicting the Official Cash Rate set by Reserve Bank of New
Zealand since December 2008.
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one share to move the market price from one seeding level to the other.
Apparently, the New Zealand First contract is mostly traded in terms of the number of
transactions and shares traded. The uncertainty around low prices is relatively greater
and the great uncertainty tends to create the volatility in prices which offers opportunities
of arbitrage and speculation. As a result, it attracts more trading. However, this is proved
to not be the case as the Variance-to-Mean ratio of the New Zealand First contract is
low among other contracts. The final outcome seems to be a surprise to the market: the
market underestimated New Zealand First’s vote share for most of the time. The high
trading volume might also be an indicator of constant arrival of new information related
to the New Zealand First’s performance during the election. New Zealand First party is
one of other minor parties but receives considerable attention. Their share of party vote
is almost as much as the aggregation of shares received by the rest of minor parties. It
has been considered as a "kingmaker" who has an important influence on the formation of
the Coalition of the government. The special attention received by their important role
in the election outcomes may have resulted in a substantial interest which is consequently
reflected in the high trading volume.
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Chapter 3
Efficiency in Prediction markets
3.1 Theoretical foundation
An efficient prediction market is claimed to be the best tool to aggregate information
because it provides incentives for information discovery and truthful revelation of be-
liefs (Hall, 2010; Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2006b). Information perceived and assessed by
individuals is likely to be correlated with actual information. Prediction markets can
serve as a simple mechanism for aggregating each individual’s information by weighting
the forecasts possessed by different individuals. They can also ensure that forecast will
reflect the true beliefs of the market’s participants by providing trading incentives. The
underlying intuition is that when trader "puts his money where his mouth is", he has
greater incentives to trade honestly with this belief than when he does not (Abramowicz,
2007).
The claim that prediction markets can efficiently aggregate information is based on the
Efficient Market Hypothesis. Market efficiency is formally defined by Fama (1969) as a
circumstance when "prices fully reflect all relevant information" to the security. He also
describes the three levels of efficiency based on the extent to which the information is
incorporated into market prices. In the weak form of efficiency, only historical prices
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are incorporated; in the semi-strong form prices also incorporate publicly and recently
available information; and in the strong form all relevant information including that only
available to insiders is incorporated. Fama’s weak and semi-strong form of market effi-
ciency are consistent with Tobin (1958)’s identifying feature of market efficiency in which
there exists no risk-free opportunity to exploit. In other words, no-arbitrage is a neces-
sary condition of market efficiency.
Hayek (1945) identifies the problem of limited information during the process of making
decisions; that is information does not exist in a "concentrated and integrated form, but
solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which
all the separate individuals possess". Thus, one might benefit from the unique informa-
tion that he possesses if he can be involved in the decision making process. Hayek vaguely
hypothesizes that in a commonplace acting as a market, limited information possessed by
individuals is communicated sufficiently through many intermediaries and it was prices
that acted as subjective values to help the individual to deliver his plans and coordinate
the separate actions of various individuals. Following Hayek’s theory, Fama (1969) pro-
vides both theoretical reason and empirical evidence to prove that stock prices "at a time
fully reflect all available information". Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) document a set of
sufficient conditions for the equilibrium price to summarize private information perfectly
assuming that every trader has Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility function and each
receives independent draws from a normal distribution about the true value of the asset.
As in other financial markets, potential trading profit is an incentive of information dis-
covery. Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) challenge the validity of EMH by introducing the
impossibility of prices being fully efficient. They argue that if prices fully reflect informa-
tion, then there is no incentive for any trader to gather information("No-trade theorem").
Instead, they consider the case where information is expensive to garner and prices never
fully reflect all available information. In equilibrium the inefficiency in pricing is sufficient
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to induce a proportion of traders to become informed.
Prediction markets provide financial or non-financial for traders to trade honestly and
reveal truthfully their beliefs. In some circumstances, when prediction markets are to
be used as inputs into future decisions, trading dishonestly and manipulating prices may
be beneficial to some traders. However, a number of studies have provided empirical
evidence that such manipulation would typically lead the manipulator to lose money.
These losses increase the rewards for informed trading, which may ultimately increase
the accuracy of prediction markets (Hanson and Oprea, 2009).
In certain cases, existing theories regarding efficient capital markets can be applied di-
rectly to prediction markets thanks to the sharing of operating mechanism. At least
one theoretical reason to believe that prediction markets should help diminish cognitive
biases is that individuals who have a more sophisticated model for assessing the probabil-
ity generally have greater confidence and willingness to place bets in prediction markets
when the current prices are inaccurate as suggested by their model.
A possible explanation for the information aggregation in prediction markets derives from
a theory called "Marginal Trader Hypothesis" proposed by Forsythe et al. (1992). The
theory claims that the information aggregation is determined by a small group of well-
informed traders called "marginal traders". The official definition of "marginal traders"
refers to those who are "correctly informed" (Oi, 1974; Viscusi, 1979, 1983). However,
it is unlikely in practice that any individual would have complete information, therefore
the equilibrium price is hard to define. Alternatively, marginal traders can be defined by
characteristics of their trading activities. They are arbitrageurs who trade to exploit risk-
free profit opportunities or speculators who trade when market prices differ from their
forecasts. They trade rationally and suffer no judgement bias and interpret information
about the underlying events more accurately than less well informed traders. In other
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words, their mere trading motivation is profits and they trade accordingly no matter
what their preference is. Theoretically, this would require those traders to have sufficient
information about bias of other traders who are less informed in the markets.
Forsythe et al. (1992) propose a measure of trading activity that serves to identify
marginal traders. They are those who submit limit orders (offers to buy or sell that
are entered into the queues without resulting in immediate trades) at prices close to the
market prices. They trade more actively (measured by the number of days that trades
occur) and invest more. Marginal traders earn higher returns. The authors find that the
median return rate for non-marginal traders was 0% but for marginal traders it was 9.6%
in the 1988 US presidential election prediction markets (Iowa Electronic Market).
Marginal traders are believed to drive prices to their efficient level and keep them there.
The theory is supported by empirical findings regarding the Iowa Electronic Market
(Forsythe et al., 1992, 1999; Berg et al., 2001). Even though they find evidence of biased
trading, the aggregate market prices produce highly accurate predictions. The theory
also implies the importance of including non-marginal traders in the market. Although
non-marginal traders tend to drive prices away from the efficient level, the divergence
provides incentives for marginal traders to enter the market, exploit the mispricing by
trading against non-marginal traders and eventually drive prices to their efficient level.
Traders in Iowa Electronic Market do not appear to be fully rational. It is evident that
a large proportion of market participants conduct trade based on their personal pref-
erences and are therefore subject to judgement bias (Forsythe et al., 1992; Berg and
Rietz, 2006). In addition, traders frequently trade in a manner that does not exploit
the availability of prices (Oliven and Rietz, 2004): they submit offers to buy or sell that
higher or lower than currently available offers in the market. In contrast, a relatively
small group of traders shows no indication of judgement bias in their trading activities
in keeping with the hypothesized marginal traders. The difference between the average
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net purchase of shares in the two major candidates is small and statistically insignifi-
cant in the 1988 presidential election markets (IEM) (Forsythe et al., 1992). Marginal
traders also appear to recognize when relevant news occurs and when it does not. They
can be experts or those who invest time and effort acquiring and interpreting information.
The "Marginal Trader Hypothesis" provides evidence favourable to the famous "Hayek
Hypothesis" by Smith (1982). Smith (1982) defines the Hayek Hypothesis as: "Strict pri-
vacy [of information] together with the trading rules of a market institution are sufficient
to produce competitive market outcomes at or near 100% efficiency". By implication the
Hayek Hypothesis also claims that markets aggregate information efficiently despite a
large proportion of biased trading.
However, the "Marginal Trader Hypothesis" is challenged by other theories and empirical
findings. Beckmann and Werding (1996); Bruggelambert (2004) find no evidence of the
presence of unbiased traders in prediction markets. Surowiecki (2004) also raises doubts
on the power of a small group of "marginal traders" to offset the majority. Market prices
are set by large trades, unless those "marginal traders" have generous budgets, they cannot
outweigh the rest of the market and consequently the information aggregation cannot be
achieved. In other words, budget constraints limits the ability of those traders to drive
prices to the level that matches their forecast1. He argues that there exists no single
trader or even a small group of traders who can ensure prices are at the efficient level
due to budget constraints.
Some studies of the "Hayek hypothesis" actually provide evidence against the "Marginal
Trader Hypothesis" when taken to an extreme. (Gode and Sunder, 1993; Othman, 2008)
conduct computational studies where markets are set up with "zero-intelligence agents"
in which it is claimed that the predictive performance of markets composed of robots are
1iPredict set a deposit limit to $2500 per 6 months per account, subject to a lifetime net contribution
limit $10,000 in total.
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as good as those with human traders. This claim denies the role of marginal traders in
the divergence of prices to their efficient allocation.
3.2 Empirical evidence
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006b) studying the IEM and Tradesports markets, find that
relevant news is incorporated into market prices quickly. Prices of the President Bush
contract in the 2004 re-election dropped immediately as the polls suggesting a winning
chance of Kerry were leaked at 3pm of the Election Day (Figure 3.1). As time passed by,
the previous polls were realized to be wrong and the market prices went up sharply as a
correction. The price movement in the election market matched with a similar pattern
in S&P equity market.
Figure 3.1: 2004 U.S Presidential Election
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Prediction markets meet at least the weak-form efficiency: prices follow the random walk
and any trading strategies based on public information do not produce abnormal returns.
This is demonstrated in a Tradesports contract betting whether Saddam Hussein were
removed from power by the end of June 2003 (Leigh et al., 2003). The contract price
did not follow a predictable pattern. No simple trading strategies based on historical
prices produces abnormal returns. A study conducted by Bondarenko and Bossaerts
(2000) using the data of the IEM suggests the same conclusion that market participants
respond rationally to new information. Although market participants have been shown
to display a certain level of bias in their trading decisions, it is not sufficient to create a
trading strategy that can beat the market and produce abnormal returns. In the IEM and
Tradesports markets, arbitrage opportunities are present but do not produce abnormal
profits (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2006b). Tetlock (2004) studying Tradesports finds that
the financial contracts are largely efficiently priced and thus few arbitrage opportunities
are detected. Tetlock (2004) compares the analogy of markets betting on sports versus
on financial events in Tradesport. Mispricing in sports game contracts is significantly
greater than mispricing in financial markets: the reverse favourite-longshot bias and the
tendency of overreaction are present in the contracts on sports games but no such bias
is found in the financial contracts. The efficiency of financial markets is remarkable even
though they share the same liquidity, volume and structure with the contracts on sports
games.
Leigh and Wolfers (2006) study the performance of various prediction markets relative
to that of opinion polls and that produced by econometric models using recent economic
data in the 2004 Australian election and find evidence supporting the efficiency of pre-
diction markets. First, they find only one arbitrage opportunity by trading across two
prediction markets and it yielded an expected profit margin of 2%. Second, prices appear
to respond quickly to relevant campaign news. Last, Leigh and Wolfers (2006) note that
prices exhibit a sensible degree of volatility when compared with opinion polls. The ran-
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dom walk hypothesis on the price level cannot be rejected while the stationary behaviour
is not clear; no predictable pattern in price changes is evident and in one market prices
efficiently incorporate information while in the other market there exist some lag in the
incorporation of polling data but the correlation between market prices and poll results
is too small to yield profitable opportunities.
Forsythe et al. (1992) builds a theoretical framework studying the causality between mar-
ket prices and opinion polls and finds weak evidence of a random walk in market prices
and that there is a small group of traders producing correct prices. Plus, in the compar-
ison with opinion polls, the market works well and the availability of polls’ information
has little effect on prices.
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Chapter 4
A study of Arbitrage
4.1 Theoretical Background
4.1.1 The role of Arbitrage in Market Efficiency
Fama (1969) defines market efficiency as circumstances in which prices fully reflect all
available information, and formally as a martingale property of prices. LeRoy (1973)
and Lucas (1978) are among the first to clarify that, with risk aversion, only discounted,
risk-adjusted prices could have the martingale property. Whereas Malkiel (2003) uses the
non-existence of trading strategies that produce positive, expected, risk-adjusted excess
returns as the definition of market efficiency.
The definition of market efficiency in the literature has two main features: (1) prices
fully reflect all available information, and (2) there are no trading strategies that produce
positive, expected, risk-adjusted excess returns. The Efficient Market Hypothesis asserts
that in an efficient market prices reflect information as soon as the information arrives.
News spreads very quickly and is incorporated into the prices without delay (Fama, 1969).
An implication is that no trading rules relying on either technical analysis, which is the
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study of past stock prices in an attempt to predict future prices, or fundamental analysis1,
which is the analysis of financial information, would enable an investor to obtain returns
that are higher than those that could be obtained from holding a random portfolio with
comparably equal risk.
In other words, if prices fully reflect all available information, then it is generally true that
there exists no trading strategy that produces risk-free positive expected (risk-adjusted)
excess returns. The response of investors to new information is rapid and rational, bidding
prices up or down until they eliminate any advantages to trading on the new information.
Thus, according to the EMH, the existence of arbitrage is a signal of market inefficiency.
In principle, arbitrage is defined as "the simultaneous purchase and sale of the same
or essential similar security in two different markets for advantageously different prices"
(Sharpe and Alexander, 1990). Arbitrage involves no negative cash flow at any proba-
bilistic state and a positive cashflow in at least one state. In simple terms; it generates a
non-zero probability of a risk-free profit. The existence of an arbitrage opportunity is con-
sidered information that is publicly available to all market participants. Traders detect
an arbitrage opportunity as soon as it arises and take advantage of it in order to obtain
risk free profits. An efficient market (at least in the semi-strong state) should expect
arbitrage to be eliminated very quickly because a sufficient number of traders will trade
in order to take advantage of it by bidding prices toward its arbitrage-free level. In other
words, the existence of arbitrage itself might not nullify a claim of market inefficiency
if the arbitrage opportunity is quickly driven away by the pursuit of profits. However,
a persistent arbitrage opportunity may indicate the inability of a market to eliminate
the mispricing. And this can be caused by the obstacles to the process of eliminating
mispricing in the market which is referred as limits to arbitrage.
1While new financial information may give rise to a change in the fundamentals of a company and
hence analyst’s expectation of its stock price, once that information is incorporated into prices, it no
longer has any ability to generate additional excess returns.
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There exists no benchmark of determining how fast an arbitrage opportunity is to be
eliminated so that it does not indicate market inefficiency. The speed of elimination of
arbitrage varies and determined by many factors including characteristics of individual
markets itself, and of traders trading in the market. Those factors include transaction
costs, market liquidity, traders’ attitude toward risk and their preferred trading strategy,
traders’ price assessment, traders’ search strategies, the allocation of relevant informa-
tion among market participants and traders’ budget constraints. Transaction costs add
to the costs of buying and selling assets and consequently affect the optimizing behavior
of traders, thus it must be taken into account. Naturally traders only engage in trading
at a market price if it promises a (expected) profit, that is, the expected profit is sufficient
to cover the transaction costs. Thus the presence of transaction costs in disequilibrium
markets is expected to discourage trading by reducing expected profits and restrain the
price movement toward its equilibrium level. Consequently, transaction costs are believed
to reduce the speed of price convergence to equilibrium.
A liquid market should expect that arbitrage is detected and driven away very quickly
because it has a large number of active traders watching the market closely. Another
measure of market liquidity is the bid and ask spread. Because arbitraging typically in-
cludes crossing the spread, a narrow spread presents arbitrageurs with less of a cost than
a wide spread. A large bid and ask spread, in the other hand, reduces trading profits as it
plays a role has an effect similar to that of transaction costs and as a result, discourages
arbitrageurs to trade.
The speed at which mispricing is corrected is also affected by traders’ characteristics.
Trader’ attitude toward risk, preferences over trading of certain commodities, the price
search strategy and rationality have impact on traders’ utility optimizing behavior and
how they trade and eventually influence how prices are set. Budget constraints also play a
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role in incomplete markets; traders who detect arbitrage opportunities but are restrained
by budgets might not be able to drive a market price to the point at which they think it
should be. Last, information is dispersed among traders in the market and may not be
possessed entirely by one individual. The allocation of relevant information among groups
of market participants may determine how fast information is incorporated into market
prices and eventually affect how quick mispricing is detected. If relevant information is
held mostly by a group with tight budget constraints, traders in that group may not be
able to take advantage of their information possession into trade against the market in
order to remove the mispricing.
An alternative approach to study the role of arbitrage is in the context of trading out of
equilibrium. Market efficiency requires market prices to reflect all relevant information.
This only can happen in frictionless markets where there exists no constraints to arbitrage
and new information is held by all interested parties. In an efficient market, as soon as
new information arises, the market will move instantaneously from the current equilibrium
position to a new one. From the view of Rational Expectations theory, any disequilib-
rium will disappear very quickly if not instantaneously and competitive equilibria will be
reached quickly and maintained thereafter until the arrival of new information. The First
Theorem of Welfare Economics states that equilibrium in competitive markets without
externalities and frictions are Pareto efficient. This means that a market in equilibrium
is also trading at an efficient allocation. Generally, every market has certain frictions
that reduce the speed by which market prices reach a new equilibrium. There will always
be trading out of equilibrium required to move to a new equilibrium. Therefore, during
the convergence process, there are trades taking places at out of equilibrium prices and
this is where the arbitrage opportunities arise. However, these arbitrage opportunities
are a result of information and price changes, and in fact, reflect the incorporation of
new information into prices. Thus arbitrage arising from the process of moving to a new
equilibrium is temporary and is thus not indicative of market inefficiency. Plus, the speed
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of convergence to equilibrium represents the speed of new information being incorporated
in market prices and is a measure of market efficiency.
Once a market is trading at equilibrium, it is efficient. However, what is more interesting
is market being out of equilibrium will converge to an efficient allocation under specific
conditions. There have been intensive studies on this subject, including Goldman and
Starr (1982) in which they characterize the conditions required for a disequilibrium to
converge to a Pareto optimal allocation in an exchange market in which traders undertake
multiple transactions in small groups and trade directly with each other instead of using
an intermediary.
Fisher (1981) develops a model of equilibrium stability which gives insight into how the
economy converges to a new equilibrium with different set of allocations and prices after
a temporary shock. In the model set up, he allows for the awareness of disequilibrium.
Traders are aware that they are trading at out-of-equilibrium prices and prices are ex-
pected to change continuously. They are also aware of the risk that they may not be able
to complete their transactions at the desirable prices due to the constant price changes.
This is an advance on previous studies in which traders are assumed to trade naively.
This new awareness will consequently change the trading behavior, as now they optimize
their utility by taking into account the price changes, the disequilibrium status of market
prices and the risk of transaction failure. The model shows that as soon as information
arrives, the equilibrium allocation will move to a new level. Simultaneously at the current
price arise arbitrage opportunities. Those opportunities will be arbitraged away quickly
by the pursuit of profits and the market will eventually converge to the new equilibrium.
This finding indeed supports the Rational Expectations theory which argues that there
exists no arbitrage at equilibrium. In a dynamic economy in which it is expected to
have new information arriving continuously, equilibrium allocations are not unique and
fixed. Arbitrage will cease as soon as the equilibrium allocation is reached. Accordingly,
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arbitrage plays an essential role in the convergence to equilibrium - it is the mechanism
of driving mispricing away and moving the economy to new equilibrium corresponding
with new information.
Ghosal and Porter (2013)’s study shows similar findings to Fisher (1981)’s. They study
whether out-of-equilibrium trading converges to an efficient allocation in a pure exchange
economy where there are only two traders (pairwise) and orders are matched randomly.
They also allow disequilibrium awareness. In their model set up, trader’ preferences are
presented by a Cobb-Douglass utility function. Traders trade cautiously acknowledging
that their prediction may turn out to be wrong and their knowledge about the preference
of their trading partner is limited. They only engage in trading if it increases their utility.
As a result, the trading process is path dependent. Ghosal and Porter (2013) confirm
Fisher (1981)’s findings about the sources of instability, the certain convergence to opti-
mal allocation and how it is achieved. The authors agree that if there is no arrival of new
information or no new perception of opportunities, the economy will stop moving and
stay at its equilibrium i.e. being stable. The mechanism of how the economy reaches new
equilibrium after a shock explained in their study is similar with that of Fisher (1981).
The authors also recognize that arbitrage assists to the convergence to a new equilibrium
by driving away old profitable trading opportunities. Their study provides numerical
evidence that the trading process in their model converges with probability to pairwise
optimal allocations. These allocations are Pareto efficient subject to specific conditions.
In summary, the convergence of out-of-equilibrium trading to efficient allocations provides
further insight into the role of arbitrage. Most trading in a market is out of equilibrium
and out-of-equilibrium trading converges to efficient allocations under some specific as-
sumptions. Arbitrage opportunities arise as the market is trading out of equilibrium, or
in other words, arbitrage is a result of price changes. In frictionless markets, as soon as
those opportunities arise, traders will arbitrage them away. Arbitrage contributes to the
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convergence process by removing mispricing in the market and driving market prices to
their equilibrium level. The speed at which it does so is a measure of market efficiency.
Therefore, the question is no longer whether arbitrage opportunities exist but how fast
they are eliminated so that the market converges to equilibrium. As mentioned earlier, it
is very difficult to specify the exact dynamic process of the adjustment to equilibrium and
its speed because it depends on the properties of individual markets. The most relevant
finding is in study of Ghosal and Porter (2013) in which they use a numerical approach
to study the average speed of convergence for a Cobb Douglas utility function. They look
mainly at the estimated convergence in average global utility and assess the performance
of cautious trading. Their study shows that "the speed of convergence remains exponen-
tial with Cobb-Douglass utility functions" for a range of sizes (both in terms of number
of goods and number of agents) of economy.
In order to illustrate the role of arbitrage in market equilibrium, Foley (1999) develops
an example of statistical equilibrium in a simplified asset market where there is a single
financial asset and traders only trade on one side of the market (they either own the asset
to sell or own money to buy the asset). He finds that the statistical equilibrium in this
market fails to achieve Pareto efficiency because some potential profitable transactions
fail to be executed, and there is a dispersion in actual market prices. Thus, there are
opportunities for arbitrage (which cannot be exploited by the primitive buyers and sellers
because each can transact only on one side of the market). He then allows arbitrageurs
to trade on either side of the market and shows that if there is a significant number of
arbitrageurs in the market, arbitrage will lead the market to efficiency. The process will
continue until the excess demand is eliminated. In this respect, arbitrageurs play the role
of an auctioneer whose function is to adjust the auction price according to traders’ orders.
However, while auctioneer simply plays a role of a coordinator of supply and demand and
is exposed to no risks, arbitrageurs face budget constraints and the liquidity risk.
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In summary, the relationship between arbitrage and efficiency is not a black and white
story; their mutual interaction is not a simple causation. As investigating market ef-
ficiency with regards to arbitrage, the question is not so much about the existence of
arbitrage; instead, it is rather about its persistence and significance and more impor-
tantly, how long it takes for the market to arbitrage those opportunities away. Arbitrage
only indicates market inefficiency when it yields significant profits compared with alter-
native risk-free investments which are persistent over a long period of time. Alternatively,
market instability and the resulting price changes may also elicit arbitrage. Arbitrage, by
its nature as a mechanism to remove the price divergence from the efficient level, prompts
the convergence of out-of-equilibrium trading to efficient allocations.
4.1.2 Arbitrage in Prediction Markets
In principle, arbitrage is risk-free; however, it involves transaction risks in practice. Ar-
bitrage transactions in financial markets involve three main risks. These risk factors and
other considerations is often referred to as the limits of arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny,
1997; Xiong, 2001; Kondor, 2009).
The first is execution risk. Arbitrage is not simply the act of buying a product in one
market and selling it in another market for a higher price at some later time. The trans-
actions must occur simultaneously to avoid the exposure to market risk: the risk that
prices may change in one market before both transactions are complete. In other words,
execution risk arises where it is impossible to close two or more transactions at the same
instant. Therefore, there is a possibility that one part of the deal is closed, and there is a
quick shift in prices that makes it impossible to close the other at a price that produces
an arbitrage profit.
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Second, mismatch risk occurs if the items being sold and bought are not identical and the
arbitrage is conducted under the assumption that the prices of the items are correlated
and predictable. This can be narrowly referred to as a convergence trade: Arbitrage
tends to reduce price discrimination by encouraging people to buy the item when the
price is low and sell where price is high. Thus arbitrage has the effect of causing prices in
different markets to converge when the items are sufficiently similar. The speed of price
convergence is a measure of market efficiency: an efficient market should expect a quick
price convergence. Transaction costs, taxes, and other costs provide an impediment to
this kind of arbitrage, particularly between different markets.
Last, counterparty risk occurs due to the possibility that a counterparty fails to fulfill
their side of a transaction. It might be the failure in making payment to the seller or in
delivering the underlying assets to the buyer.
Arbitrage typically refers to the act of exploiting price differences between two or more
markets. One possible arbitrage strategy in prediction markets is to exploit the inconsis-
tent pricing of contracts predicting outcomes of the same event. This particular arbitrage
strategy fits in the definition of arbitrage because such it is risk-free and produces positive
profit. This arbitrage practice is the focus of this chapter and how it is conducted will
be discussed in more detail in the next section.
Arbitrage in the iPredict’s prediction markets is free from counterparty risk. Any trans-
action has a human trader on one side and the other side will be either another human
trader or the market maker. Trading with the market maker has no counterparty risk.
The market maker never fails to fulfill its obligation of the trade because it can create as
many shares as it needs to (when it is on the short position) and it is most unlikely for a
market maker not to have sufficient funds to complete the trade (when it is on the long
position). Trading against a human trader is also free from the counterparty risk. The
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market operator ensures that the long side of the trade has sufficient funds to execute
the purchase. iPredict buyers trade on their deposit so transactions will not be executed
if they do not have sufficient fund in their deposit to fulfill their purchase. The short
side has to pay upfront to insure against the maximum loss before a sale is executed. For
instance a trader short-selling a stock (which will close at $1) at 60 cents does not receive
60 cents immediately once the sale takes place. Instead he has to pay upfront 40 cents
to the market maker. This is because in the worst case that the contract closes at $1, he
has to buy the stock at $1 to cover for his precedent short position. The maximum loss
of the short sell in this example is 40 cents.
Trading in iPredict is also free from mismatch risk because stocks being traded are iden-
tical across contracts in the same event within a prediction market. To the extent that
other prediction markets utilise a market maker and deposits, these risks would not be
present. Arbitrage in iPredict is exposed only to the execution risk. There may be the
case that having closed one side of the deal, a shift in price occurs at the time of closing
of the other side. However, this risk is not a serious concern in most prediction markets
where traders can observe a schedule of prices to buy or to sell beforehand. Therefore, a
shift in market prices may be unavoidable but the new level of market prices, if there is
a shift in price, is observable according to the price schedule. In other words, a shift may
occur but there is a degree of certainty over the likely new prices.
I do not consider arbitrage across events or across prediction markets in this chapter.
Arbitrage across events is not feasible because there is unlikely to exist two (or more)
different events that are entirely related and more importantly, share the same attributes
especially set of possible outcomes and their associated likelihood.
Arbitrage across prediction markets is possible and actually has been observed in practice
overseas. It is quite common that various prediction markets develop contracts predicting
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exactly the same event and it is quite possible that contracts offered by those prediction
markets are of the same type (binary, index or spreading contracts) and have the same
payout structure. However, conducting this trading practice requires a more complex
technique and arguably a great deal more effort spent on watching the markets. The
opportunity cost of arbitrage across prediction markets, therefore, will be much higher
and consequently make it less profitable for arbitrageurs. There were no other local
prediction markets offering index contracts on party vote share for the New Zealand 2011
General Election. While it is possible that there were overseas markets, arbitrage across
border obviously introduces further complexity that would reduce the profitability of
arbitrage.
4.2 Theoretical Framework
4.2.1 Arbitrage Framework: Without bid and ask Spread
The most straightforward arbitrage opportunity in prediction markets is to exploit any
divergence of the aggregate price of contracts predicting the same event from the con-
tract’s payout. The eight index contracts in the vote share market share the same payout
value: paying 1 cent for each percentage of the total party vote received by the underlying
party. The set of eight contract predicting the same event forms a contract bundle. The
bundle price is the aggregate price of all contracts in the same bundle at any point in time.
Because the actual vote share is within 0 and 100%, the contract price varies within $0
and $1. As the price is assumed to coincide with the estimate of the underlying outcome,
i.e. market prices are unbiased, the prices of all contracts predicting the same event must
sum up to $1, i.e. the bundle price should be equal to $1. The aggregate price of $1 is a
necessary but not sufficient condition of the unbiasedness of market prices. This will be
discussed at the end of this section.
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First, I assume that transactions are cost-free. Let pi(t) be the transacted price of contract
i (i = 1, ..., 8) at time t predicting the event whose maturity time is T . At time T , the
actual outcome is realized and all contracts are closed and pay out. All contracts i are
launched at the same time (t = 0) and closed at the same maturity time T .
Let
p(t) =
8∑
i=1
pi(t) (4.1)
be the aggregate price of all contracts i at time t.
At maturity T , because the total vote sums up to 100%, the aggregate price of all contracts
is exactly $1 so is the total payout.
p(T ) =
8∑
i=1
pi(T ) = $1 (4.2)
At any time t, the aggregate price p(t) should be $1 otherwise arbitrage will arise by ex-
ploiting the divergence of p(t) from $1. Arbitrage exploiting the mispricing of the bundle
price arises in two scenarios, each requiring a different strategy but both bear no risk.
First, if p(t) < $1, there is at least one underpriced contract. Arbitrage requires purchas-
ing the entire bundle i.e. holding one share of each contract and holding it until the close
time T . At maturity T , the bundle will pay out $1. Arbitrage profit is $1− p(t). Second,
if p(t) > $1, there is at least one overpriced contract. Arbitrage requires short-selling the
entire bundle (i.e. sell one share of each contract) and hold it until time T . At time T ,
the bundle is worth $1, and he will buy the bundle which costs $1 to cover his precedent
short position. Arbitrage profit in this case is p(t)− $1.
Let y(t) be the difference between p(t) and $1. Arbitrage arises whenever
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y(t) = p(t)− $1 6= 0 (4.3)
Accordingly, arbitrage profit is
pi(t) = |y(t)| = |p(t)− $1| (4.4)
In practice, there may exist situations of measured y 6= 0 that arise because the price
level is in the process of change (trading out of equilibrium). This might show up as
serial correlation in y(t); arbitrage profit is higher when prices change in response to the
arrival of new information. The efficient market hypothesis says that in a complete or
fully efficient market y(t) should not be serially correlated. If serial correlation appears
because of the adjustment in price level changes to the arrival of new information, it is
unlikely to be persistent. This is due to trading out of equilibrium and these market level
price changes will presumably happen quickly.
Next, the assumption of cost-free transactions is relaxed, the condition for an arbitrage
to be profitable in Equation (4.3) no longer holds. Instead, arbitrage is only profitable
if the gain from arbitrage is sufficient to cover transaction costs, otherwise there is no
incentive to arbitrage.
Transaction cost varies in prediction markets. iPredict charges three different types of
fees. A trading fee of $0.0035 per share traded (35 cents per 100 shares traded) was
introduced in August 2011. Also, a 1.75% fee on credit card deposits is paid to the bank.
This cost can be easily avoided by a manual deposit into iPredict’s bank account. Last,
a withdrawal fee of 2% or $2 (whichever is greater) is incurred only if the trader has
positive earnings on iPredict. Only the trading fee of $0.0035 per share traded should
be included as transaction cost in this framework because it is incurred as soon as the
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transaction occurs. The fee on credit card deposit is avoidable (by a manual deposit) and
the withdrawal fees incurs only when a withdrawal of funds is made into cash.
In the presence of transaction costs, arbitrage also arises in two scenarios as mentioned
above. However, in order to ensure that the arbitrage is profitable, arbitrage arises when-
ever p(t) is greater than $1+$0.028 = $1.028 or less than $1−$0.028 = $0.9722. The two
conditions are explained as follows. First, if p(t) < $0.972, arbitrage requires purchasing
the entire bundle (8 transactions to be made), and holding it until the close time T . The
purchase costs p(t) + $0.028. At maturity T , the trader will be paid $1. The arbitrage
profit is thus $1− p(t)− $0.028 = $0.972− p(t) > 0.
Second, if p(t) > $1.028, an arbitrageur will short-sell the entire bundle and receive
p(t) − $0.028 from the sale. At time T , he will have to buy the bundle to cover his
precedent short position. At T , the bundle price is $1. The purchase costs him $1.028.
Arbitrage profit is p(t)−$1−2×$0.028. This implies that the short-sell-and-cover strategy
would cost more than the buy-now-and-hold strategy. However, iPredict offers a feature
to eliminate the cost disadvantage of short-selling practice and encourage arbitrage. The
feature called Buy-a-Bundle allows purchasing a contract bundle at $1; this means that
purchasing an entire bundle is not subject to the trading fee. So whenever p(t) > $1.028,
arbitrage strategy is as follows: Use Buy-a-Bundle feature to buy the entire bundle at
$1 and right after the purchase sell it for p(t), the purchase will incur transaction cost
$0.028. Adopting this strategy, arbitrage profit will be p(t)− $1.028 > 0.
In summary, arbitrage profit when there exists a transaction cost equals:
2The cost of trading a bundle of eight contracts is 8× $0.0035 = $0.028.
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pi(t) = max(0, |p(t)− $1| − $0.028)
or equivalently
pi(t) = max(0, |y(t)| − $0.028)
(4.5)
The above arbitrage strategies fit in the definition of arbitrage because they are exposed
to no risk and produce guaranteed positive profits. The term "no risk" simply relates to
the fact that traders do not speculate on the movement of the market price. This trad-
ing practice does not require the possession of superior information in order to beat the
market. Arbitrage in iPredict is exposed to the execution risk but this is not a serious
issue. Even though there still exists the risk that their orders are not to executed at
the desirable price, traders would not be totally surprised by the shift in price because
they can observe the price schedule of offers to buy and to sell beforehand. Arbitrage
according to this framework does not suffer mismatch risk because it does not involve
trading items across different prediction markets. Counterparty risk should not be a con-
cern either. The market maker is always able to fulfill its obligation to a trade therefore
the counterparty risk as trading against market maker is almost zero because in iPredict,
the contract payout on contracts is financed mostly by traders’ funds. Traders’ funds are
held in a trust account separate from iPredict’s account; iPredict’s creditors do not have
access to that trust account. If one trades against another trader, his long position is
secure because market maker requires short-sellers to pay upfront for the maximum loss.
If he takes short position, market maker will ensure that the other side of the trade has
sufficient fund otherwise the transaction will not be executed.
There are a few issues with this framework which need to be addressed. First, the deriva-
tion of arbitrage profit in Equation (4.4) and (4.5) requires an underlying assumption
that at any time t, trader can buy and sell shares at the same price, i.e the price order to
buy coincides with the price offer to sell. In order words, there is no price discrimination
between sell and buy orders. In practice, the offer prices to buy and sell never coincide.
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From the perspective of traders, price offer to buy is always higher than that to sell. This
assumption will be relaxed in Section 4.2.2.
The second issue is that the framework ignores the fact that arbitrage at any time t has to
be based on the current offers in the market at time t, not the last traded price. This price
is historical and may be no longer available for trading at the current time. Arbitrage
based on this last traded price may mislead the possibility and significance of arbitrage in
the market. For instance, suppose at time t, a purchase occurs at the price 40 cents. If the
volume of the this trade is sufficient to move up the market price above 40 cents then any
traders coming to the market wish to buy the stock will have to pay a higher price than 40
cents (assume other things remain constant). This issue will be addressed in Section 4.2.2.
Third, if more than one unit of a bundle is traded at a time, it is not guaranteed that
the second unit will be traded at the same price as the first unit or not all units may be
acquirable or saleable at the same price. Recall the table listing buy and sell offers in a
market of iPredict (Figure 2.1), if a trader attempts to buy 200 shares, he will have to
pay 50 cents per share for the first 100 shares and 51.67 cents for the last 100 shares.
The framework does not capture this price discrimination associated with the size of
trading orders. In order to keep this simple, I examine arbitrage on the basis of one share
traded at a time. This means that every transaction is either to buy or sell a unit of share.
The fourth issue comes from the fact that the framework does not capture a cost associ-
ated with the timing of transaction. As capital is invested to buy shares, until the close
day of the contract that capital is tied up in the form of shares. The foregone returns
from reinvesting the capital is considered as an opportunity cost. Of the two arbitrage
strategies described above, only the buy-now-and-hold strategy exploiting the p(t) being
smaller than $1 incurs this cost. This strategy requires the trader to invest capital to
buy shares now and hold them until the contract is closed. This opportunity cost gets
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larger as the purchase of shares occurs at earlier time to the maturity T . For instance,
arbitrage occurring one week before the close day of contract bears less cost than that
occurring one month before.
The fifth issue is that the derivation of arbitrage profit ignores the discount factor. The
payoff of an arbitrage received at maturity should be discounted at an appropriate dis-
counting rate. Accordingly, arbitrage profit will be the absolute value of the difference
between the present value of the payoff ($1) and y(t) instead. As a result, ignoring the
discount factor arbitrage profit calculated by this framework is expected to be overesti-
mated. This issue will be addressed and fixed in Section 4.3 when the arbitrage returns
is discounted in order to be in the comparison with risk-free rates.
Sixth, the framework also ignores the cap on trading fee. The trading fee is capped at
5% of any trade’s gross cash value, and capped at $5 per month per user. Obviously, to
traders who conduct trades large value, the trading fee per share to be paid by him is
less than the standard 0.35 cents per share. It is difficult to take this limit in trading fee
into account because it depends on each individual’s total trading value.
The last issue involves the relationship of the unbiasedness of prediction market prices
Assume that prediction market prices coincide exactly with the market’s aggregate belief.
i.e. the market prices are unbiased and an accurate predictor of the event. Then the con-
dition for an arbitrage to arise provided in the framework holds: the aggregate price of
contracts predicting the same event diverges from $1. However, the framework is also able
to detect arbitrage even when prediction market prices are not unbiased. Consider an
event with two possible and mutually exclusive outcomes whose market prices are called
p1 and p2 (i = 1, 2). Arbitrage arises whenever p1+p2 6= $1 (assume no transaction cost).
This condition does not require the unbiasedness of market prices. For instance, the mar-
ket believes that the probabilities that the outcome 1 and 2 occurs are 30% and 70% but
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their contracts’ market prices are 50 cents and 60 cents, respectively. This means that
the market price of contract 1 is overpriced and that of contract 2 is underpriced. The
market prices are biased but their aggregate price is greater than $1 ($1.1). According
to the framework, arbitrage is detected which requires short selling a bundle consisting
of one share of each contract for $1.1. When the outcomes are realized and contracts are
closed, arbitrager pays $1 to cover their precedent short position and realizes the profit of
10 cents. Besides, there exists another strategy to exploit the mispricing in contract 1 and
contract 2: short sell the overpriced p1 and buy the underpriced p2. However, this trading
practice which relies on the mispricing in individual contracts is not considered arbitrage
even though it produces positive profit. This is because this profit is not a risk-free. In
order to take advantage of this mispricing, a trader is required to have information as
to which contract is underprice and overpriced. This sort of information can never be
obtained with 100% of certainty until the outcome of the event is realized. This practice
fits in better the definition of speculation than arbitrage and thus is not considered in
this study.
Efficiency reflects the extent to which information is incorporated into market prices. To
the extent that this precludes irrelevant information (that does not influence the under-
lying value of asset) then prices in a truly efficient market should be influenced only by
information that affects the asset and should be unaffected by extraneous factors such
as traders’ biases. However, the issue is not whether prediction markets are completely
efficient but rather the extent to which any inefficiencies influence the market pricing.
Thus in my examination of efficiency I do not look for unbiased prices for each and every
contract. Instead, this thesis limits itself to examining whether the pricing of the bundle
of contracts is indicative of inefficiency. It is entirely possible that trading in a particular
contract is biased. However, if that bias is offset by an equal but opposite bias in the
other contracts then the price of the resulting bundle is unlikely to be significantly differ-
ent from $1. Accordingly, if prices are unbiased, there will be no arbitrage in the market.
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However, the argument in the opposite direction is not necessarily true. The existence of
no arbitrage does not guarantee that the market prices are unbiased. Consider the above
example, the market prices p1 and p2 are 40 cents and 60 cents instead. According to the
framework, no arbitrage opportunity is detected but the market obviously misprices the
probability of the occurrence of the two outcomes, i.e. the market prices are biased. In
short, the existence of arbitrage is an indicator of market inefficiency but the existence
of no-arbitrage is a necessary but not sufficient condition of market efficiency.
Further, the deviation of market prices from the mean of market expectation may be a
result of out-of-equilibrium trading. When the unbiasedness of prediction market prices
creates arbitrage opportunities as in one of the examples above, it does not imply market
inefficiency as long as traders, in the pursuit of profits, drive away those opportunities
quickly. The act of arbitrage constitutes the process which brings the unbiased mar-
ket prices to their fundamental level and simultaneously contributes to the process of
converging out-of-equilibrium trading to efficient allocations.
4.2.2 Arbitrage Framework: With bid and ask Spread
The analysis in the previous section investigates the possibility of arbitrage based on
prices at which the last transaction occurs. This implicitly ignores the fact that as trans-
action prices are historical and anyone coming to trade in the market has to accept the
currently available offers. If he wants to buy (sell) stocks, he will have to trade at the
lowest (highest) available ask (bid) order in the market. The previous framework in Sec-
tion 4.2.1 ignored the effect of bid and ask spread on arbitrage in prediction markets. At
any single point in time the bid order has to be smaller than the ask order.
Let pbi(t) and pai (t) be the bid and ask offers of contract i at time t respectively. Any
trader who wants to sell (or buy) shares of contract i at time t has to accept pbi(t) (or pai (t)).
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Let pb(t) and pa(t) be the aggregate bid and ask order of all contracts i at time t respec-
tively.
pb(t) =
8∑
i=1
pbi(t)
pa(t) =
8∑
i=1
pai (t)
(4.6)
Let yb(t) and ya(t) be the difference between the aggregate bid and ask order of all con-
tracts i and the contract payout $1 at time t respectively.
yb(t) = pb(t)− $1
ya(t) = pa(t)− $1
(4.7)
First I assume that transactions do not incur costs. In the presence of bid and ask
spread, it is no longer true that arbitrage is profitable whenever the aggregate price of
the last transaction diverges from its efficient level (i.e. $1). Instead, arbitrage only arises
whenever one of the following conditions is satisfied. First, the aggregate ask order of
all contracts in the same market at any time t before the announcement is less than $1.
Arbitrage in this case requires buying a unit of contract bundle, paying pa(t) in total.
The portfolio is held until the contract’s maturity. The total payout is $1. Arbitrage
profit is thus the difference between $1 and pa(t). It can be written as:
Condition: pa(t) < $1 i.e. ya(t) < 0
Arbitrage profit: pi(t)(buy and hold) = $1− pa(t) = −ya(t)
Second, the aggregate bid order of all contracts in the same market is greater than $1.
Arbitrage opportunity requires short-selling a unit of contract bundle for pb(t). On the
maturity date, the payoff from the bundle is $1 and trader will pay $1 to cover for his
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precedent short position. It can be written as:
Condition: pb(t) > $1 i.e. yb(t) > 0
Arbitrage profit: pi(t)(short and cover) = $1− pb(t) = yb(t)
In sum, in the absence of transaction costs, the arbitrage profit at any time t is:
pi(t) =

−ya(t) if ya(t) < 0
yb(t) if yb(t) > 0
0 otherwise
The conditions of ya(t) < 0 and yb(t) > 0 are mutually exclusive because yb(t) < ya(t) is
always true. Thus pi(t) can be written as:
pi(t) = max(−ya(t), yb(t), 0) (4.8)
In the presence of transaction costs, buying and selling stocks incur costs. The only
relevant cost associated with trading in iPredict is the transaction fee of $0.0035 per
share traded or $0.028 per bundle. Taking this transaction fee into the analysis, arbitrage
arises whenever:
− ya(t)− $0.028 > 0 (buy and hold) , or
yb(t)− $0.028 > 0 (short sell and cover)
Arbitrage profit in the presence of transaction costs thus equals:
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pi(t) =

−ya(t)− $0.028 if − ya(t) > $0.028
yb(t)− $0.028 if yb(t) > $0.028
0 otherwise
or equivalently,
pi(t) = max{−ya(t)− $0.028, yb(t)− $0.028, 0} (4.9)
Empirical analysis requires designing a scheme to derive bid and ask offers at a single
point in time. When a trade takes place in iPredict, the system only records prices and
other information relevant to the transaction. In other words, historical bid and ask offers
are not available. Figure 4.1 shows an example of the price schedule. The contract’s last
traded price is $0.9116. In addition, traders would see a schedule of buy and sell orders
available at this specific time. Any trader who wants to buy stocks knows that he would
have to pay $0.9116 per share for the first 10 shares and $0.9168 for the next 10 shares
and etc. Similarly, whoever wants to sell stocks knows that he would be able to sell the
first 10 shares he owns at $0.9061 per share and the next 10 shares at for $0.9116 per
share. The last traded price of this contract pi(t) is $0.9116, the bid order pbi(t) is $0.9061
and the ask order pai (t) is $0.9116. The last traded price and the ask order happen to
coincide in this case but this is merely coincidence and is not necessarily true all the time.
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Figure 4.1: An example of a price schedule
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While in practice the schedule of bid and ask offers has multiple units at each price level,
for simplicity I assume that only one unit is offered for purchase or sale at each order price.
Thus, if a purchase (or sale) of a share of a stock occurs at price pi(t), it will remove the
ask (or bid) order on the top of the pricing schedule and the market maker will fill it with
a new buy (or sell) order. Any trader coming to the market after a successful transaction
has to trade at the new ask (or bid) order. Given the assumption that all bid and ask
offers are made by only the market maker, I derive bid and ask offers at each traded price
by imitating the mechanism applied by the market maker (S-curve and the formula in
Section 2.2. This assumption implicitly ignores the fact that human traders can submit
their own bid and ask offers to the market. The mechanism of deriving bid and ask offers
are manually constructed assuming that the sensitivity of the S-curve is fixed during the
contract’s lifetime. In practice, there occurs cases in which market maker adjusts the
sensitivity of the S-curve in order to ensure the subsidy loss is within the allowed level
and this accordingly affects the bid and ask spread and the liquidity of the market.
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4.3 Empirical Results
The eight contracts in the vote share market are bundled in that the sum of their payouts
equals $1, as should the aggregate price of the bundle at any given time. Arbitrage in the
vote share market is analyzed by using the framework constructed in Section 4.2. In the
absence of the bid and ask spread, the necessary and sufficient condition for a profitable
arbitrage is that the aggregate price of the bundle differs from $1 where the divergence
is greater than 2.8 cents3when trading fee is in place after August 2011 otherwise zero.
If the aggregate price is less than $1, arbitrageurs can buy the entire bundle and hold it
until the close date of the contracts. If the aggregate price is greater than $1, arbitrageurs
can short the bundle and cover their precedent short position at the close date by buying
the bundle for $1. In both cases, the arbitrage profit is the absolute value of the difference
of $1 and the aggregate price at a given time.
When the bid and ask spread is taken into account, arbitrage arises only when either the
cost of buying the bundle (i.e. the aggregate bid orders of all contracts) is greater than
$1 or the cost of shorting the bundle (i.e. the aggregate ask orders) is less than $1 and
then only if the difference is greater than the trading cost of 2.8 cents. In both cases, the
arbitrage profit is the absolute value of the difference of the aggregate bid (or ask) order
and $1. The trading fee of 2.8 cents per bundle traded is only applied to transactions
occurring after August 2011.
The empirical analysis has resulted in some observations as follows. First, without con-
sidering the bid and ask spread, the (unconditional) mean of arbitrage profit is 0.5 cents
and the probability of arbitrage is 50% out of the total number of transactions when
taking into account the bid and ask, they drop to 0.21 cents and 21.8%. Second, in order
to determine whether an arbitrage is profitable compared to the alternative, I compare
3The trading fee of buying or selling a bundle containing a share of each contract equals 8×0.35 cents
= 2.8 cents.
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its rate of return with the contemporaneous risk-free rate. The return on arbitrage in the
absence of the bid and ask spread is calculated as the ratio of the arbitrage profit (pit)
to its cost which is the sum of the aggregate last-traded price (pt) and the trading fee of
2.8 cents at any given time t. In the presence of the bid and ask spread, the last-traded
price is replaced by the ask order (pat ) where arbitrage involves buy and hold or the bid
order (pbt) where arbitrage involves short sell and cover.
Without the bid and ask spread: RORt =
pit
pt + $0.028
With the bid and ask spread: RORt =
pit
pat + $0.028
(buy and hold)
RORt =
pit
pbt + $0.028
(short and cover)
The average ROR without the bid and ask spread is 4.8% while that in the presence of
the bid and ask spread is 0.2%; their maximum values are 4% and 3%, respectively. I use
the one-year secondary market government bond yield as the benchmark risk-free rate
because the vote share market was running for approximately one year (404 days). Within
November 2, 2010 to December 10, 2011, the average of the New Zealand government
bond yield are 2.884. From Figure 4.2, the daily average arbitrage return in the vote
share market is considerably below the contemporaneous risk-free rate during most of its
lifetime, except for a strong rise on March 24, 2011 (explained below). Any investment
yielding a return less than the risk-free rate should not be undertaken because its return
is not sufficient to cover the opportunity cost. If the extreme arbitrage on March 24,
2011 is considered as an outlier, arbitrage in the vote share market never yielded a higher
return than the bond yield. If the non-existence of arbitrage is a necessary condition of
market efficiency then it is satisfied in the vote share market.
4Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Reuters
http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/exandint/b2/hb2-daily.xls
No daily data was available for the period of August to December 2011.
48
Figure 4.2: Daily average arbitrage returns vs. risk free rate
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Note: The risk-free rates are adjusted to match the time to maturity with arbitrage ROR.
The daily average is computed as the mean return across all transactions for all contracts.
Figure 4.3 gives further insight into how arbitrage opportunities compete with a risk-
free investment. Showing that the arbitrage opportunities are not persistent, they are
eliminated very quickly. The top graph plots the proportion of intra-day arbitrage returns
that are greater than the risk-free rate on the same day. Apart from the exception on
March 24, 2011, there are three occurrences when arbitrage seems to be obvious. The
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occurrence in January 2011 can be explained as a result of low trading day5 which can
be seen in the bottom plot showing the daily number of transactions.
5Of all transactions:
• January 30, 2011: Proportion without spread = 42% and with spread = 22%. Number of trans-
actions = 45.
• June 27, 2011: Proportion without spread = 65% and with spread = 0%. Number of transactions
= 60.
• July 21, 2011: Proportion without spread = 78% and with spread = 27%. Number of transactions
= 27
Overall market: Mean (daily transactions) = 51. Median (daily transactions) = 29.
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Figure 4.3: Positive arbitrage returns as a proportion of total transactions per day
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Last, one might intuitively expect a negative correlation of the arbitrage possibility (y(t))
and the time to maturity as a result of the arrival of new information. As the final out-
come draws closer, more information is revealed and that helps to correct mispricings.
However, this phenomena is not observed in the vote share market. Figure 4.4 shows no
obvious pattern in both y and |y| over the time. The spike on the launching date of the
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market was the result of a surge in the purchase of Green shares to push its price from
the initial price of 7.24 cents up to 36.6 cents. The initial price is subjectively set by
iPredict’s administrator. However, it was quickly driven back within 10 minutes to the
initial level by a number of sales.
Figure 4.4: Arbitrage possibility in the vote share market over the whole contract period
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Note: The dash line represents the trading fee of 0.028 cents per bundle.
As the variable y(t) reflects arbitrage possibility and |y(t)| is a measure of arbitrage profit,
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a sharp drop in y (and associated sharp rise in |y(t)|) at 21.00pm on March 24, 2011 as
seen in Figure 4.2 - 4.4 indicates an unusually profitable arbitrage opportunity. The value
of |y| rose to $0.08 and gradually fell back to $0 on March 25, 2011. This was caused by
a strong sale of 200 National shares and 200 Green shares which resulted in a sharp drop
in both contract prices: National dropped from 46.51 cents to 40 cents and Green 7.45
cents down to 5.12 cents without being accompanied by any increases in other contracts’
prices. However, this opportunity did not last for long. Realizing this sudden change in
the National and Green contract, a trader almost instantly (within few minutes) started
to trade against the sale. He bought a large and different amount of shares of all con-
tracts. As the result, prices of all these contracts rose: the National contract from 40
cents to 43.05 cents, the Labour contract from 31 cents to 32.7 cents, the Green contract
from 5.12 cents to 5.95 cents, the ACT contract from 3.99 cents to 4.65 cents, the United
Future contract from 2.28 cents to 3.9 cents, the New Zealand First contract 3.5 cents to
1.5 cents and the Other contract 2.56 cents to 2.87 cents. This trader also bought a small
amount of Ma¯ori contract shares but insufficient to bid up its price. The strong purchase
in all the contracts offset the negativity in y, it eventually drove y from -0.08 to -0.012
before 10.30pm, within 1.30 hours. The negativity in y was not offset entirely until early
morning on March 25, 2011 when a third trader entered the market and bought more
National shares and pushed its price back to its prior-the-shock level. The level of y was
driven back to 0 by 7.00am on that day.
The trading behaviour of the second trader is more of interest. His purchases of shares of
all contracts to exploit the mispricing in y illustrates the arbitrage practice as discussed
previously. He may have seen the drop in National and Green prices as an indication of a
shift of support toward other parties and National or Green being underpriced. However,
his trading does not entirely fit arbitrage for two reasons. First, the trader did not hold
shares until the close day, instead he sold them shortly after the purchase. One possible
explanation for this "early" liquidation is that he would not need to wait until the close
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day to receive the payout if he could sell those shares at any point in time prior as long as
the aggregate price went above at least $1. It might have been his intention to regain the
portfolio’s liquidity and sell ahead of the close. Second, he did not buy the same amount
of shares of each contract, i.e. fix the bundle. The arbitrage on my assumption requires
buying multiple bundles in which each contains one share of each contract. However, this
may be due to the position of his existing portfolio in which he already owned shares of
some contracts.
A similar arbitrage strategy was studied by Luckner et al. (2012) and applied to STOC-
CER - an experimental market set up to predict outcomes of the FIFA World Cup in 2006
using virtual currency. After taking into account the bid and ask spread, they unsurpris-
ingly showed that the occurrence and persistence of profitable arbitrage opportunities
reduced significantly when they increased an arbitrary cut-off point for identifying ar-
bitrage opportunities from one percent of the payout to ten percent. The study simply
counts the number of occasions where arbitrage occurs and produces returns that are
greater than the present cut-off point. It is not clear whether they considered transac-
tions costs.
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Chapter 5
Properties of Prices in an Efficient
Market
The specification of price change time series has an implication of information reflected
in the market prices which consequently indicates the degree of market efficiency. In the
context of the EMH, tests of weak form efficiency come from the random walk model. In
essence, a random walk means that it is not possible to earn abnormal risk-free returns
by trading according to an expected trend.
Furthermore, a random walk process is a non-stationary process whether or not it has
a constant drift (See Proof in Footnote1). A stochastic process is said to be stationary
if its mean, variance and covariance (in general, its distribution) are constant over time.
A weakly stationary process whose mean and variance are constant will have a tendency
to return to its mean (mean reversion) and any fluctuations around its mean will have
1Given a white noise process: ut ∼ N(0, σ2) Random walk model without drift can be written:
Pt = Pt−1 + ut such that Pt = P0 +
∑
ut. Therefore E(Pt) = P0 = constant since errors have zero
expectation. Similarly, V ar(Pt) = tσ2, i.e. it is dependent on time. Hence, random walk model without
a drift is a non-stationary process. Although its mean is constant over time, its variance increases over
time. In this model, shock persist as the current value is equal to the initial plus a series of random
shocks over time.
A random walk model with a drift can be written: Pt = α + Pt−1 + ut such that Pt = tα + P0 +
∑
ut.
Therefore E(Pt) = tα + P0. Similarly, V ar(Pt) = tα2. Hence a random walk model with a drift is a
non-stationary process because both its mean and variance increase over time.
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broadly constant magnitude. Alternatively, the constant variance property will ensure
that the process will not drift too far from its mean. In contrast, the mean or variance
or both of a non-stationary process will vary over time.
The weak-form EMH states that stock prices in efficient markets follow a random walk
therefore the time series of efficient stock prices is a non-stationary process, more impor-
tantly without a constant drift so that there is no opportunity for profitable speculation
in the market. Essentially, the change in stock price from one period to another is ran-
dom and unpredictable2. The drift is essentially zero otherwise price in the next period
is bounded to change by a constant level which eventually creates a certain pattern in
the price change process. Furthermore, if a variable follows a random walk model both
with or without the constant drift then its first differences are stationary3. In sum, the
random walk and the (non-) stationary process have mutual implication of the market
efficient which can be summarized as follow: Prices in a (weakly) efficient market follow
a random walk model and therefore have a non-stationary process without a constant
drift. Thus, the one-period price change series is a stationary process.
As stated earlier, the regression between the market price changes and the change in poll
results produces meaningful results only when the two time series are both stationary
processes. The stationary property of the price change time series can be induced from
the fact that the price level follows a random walk model.
The stationary property of market price changes is also necessary for a valid regression
test for the relationship between market prices and opinion polls conducted in Chapter
6. A regression in which at least one time series is non-stationary may produce invalid
2A random walk model without drift has Pt+1−Pt = P0 +
∑
ut+1−(P0 +
∑
ut) = ut+1 while random
walk model with drift has Pt+1 − Pt =
∑
α+ P0 +
∑
ut+1 − (
∑
α+ P0 +
∑
ut) = α+ ut+1.
3A random walk model without drift has one-period change written: ∆Pt+1 = Pt+1−Pt = ut+1 then
E(∆Pt+1) = 0 and V ar(∆Pt+1) = σ2.
A random walk model with drift has one-period change ∆Pt+1 = α + ut+1 then E(Pt+1 − Pt) = α and
V ar(∆Pt+1) = σ2.
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results due to spurious regression problem. It is pointed by Granger and Newbold (1974)
that if the two series are integrated and used in a regression model then a high value of
R2 is likely to arise even when the two series are unrelated.
5.1 Literature Review
5.1.1 Stationarity in stock markets
Evidence of stock prices being non-stationary have been found in previous studies. In an
attempt to look for an explanation of the departure of the change in stock prices from
normality, Fama (1965a) tests the stationary process hypothesis by looking at only the
change in mean of the one-period change in the daily log price over different periods of
time. The distribution of daily changes in log prices has long tails in which the observed
extreme values are much more extreme than would be predicted by the normality as-
sumption. In a stationary process, if a significant change in mean persists for any length
of time, it must be small. According to this study, the visual examination of stock price
changes during the sampling period to look for trends shows a large change in the mean
that persists for a long period of time. However, the empirical tests show that the ex-
treme values in the distribution can not be adequately explained by shifts in the mean.
The time series of some economic indices are shown to be non-stationary, such as indus-
trial production, consumer prices and stock prices (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992). Nelson
and Plosser (1982) studying various economic time series find that they are unable to
reject the non-stationary process without a time trend. However, there are others where
no general agreement is reached. For instance, Perron (1989) can not reject the unit root
hypothesis for the nominal interest rate. In the same direction, Chan et al. (1992) point
out that the mean reversion for the U.S. interest rate is very weak, which is a sign of
a possible unit root. However, Dahlquist (1996) finds some mean reversion effects for
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interest rates in Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the UK.
As stated earlier, if a time series follows a random walk model, it is a non-stationary
process. However, this is only true if the variable is not bounded by an upper or lower
finite limit. Such processes are not possible to follow a random walk because random walk
is limitless with probability one. This issue has been addressed by Ait-Sahalia (1996) as
in his study of the 7-day Eurodollar deposit rate. He finds a tendency of mean reversion
in the spot rate as it goes beyond a certain range. Moreover, the drift is approximately
zero when the rate is within the range. Thus, within the range from 4 to 17% the process
behaves like a random walk (as the drift is zero) but shows reversion effects whenever
some high or low levels are reached. To such processes, the usual test of stationarity is
not able to reject the unit root because the process behave like a random walk within
certain ranges. However, the bounded property will show reversionary effects at high or
low levels which eventually leads to stationarity and mean reversion.
There is a considerable amount of evidences of bounded time series not having unit roots,
for instance the purchasing power parity in various countries (Rogoff, 1996). In the same
direction, Nicolau (1999) argues that the DEM/USD exchange rate is not a random walk
despite the conclusions of the Dickey-Fuller test (the Dickey-Fuller unit root test is dis-
cussed in detail in Section 5.3. In general, there is evidence that the real exchange rate
is bounded in probability and converges to a long-run values. With regards to nominal
exchange rate, it is bounded by implicit target monetary policies. That is, the DEM/USD
behaves like a random walk but can not be a true random walk.
These studies suggest that some economic and financial time series can behave just like
a random walk but bounded in probability due to economic reasons. In an attempt to
simulate such process, Nicolau (2002) builds a model satisfying the features that allows
random walk behavior most of the time but forces mean reversions whenever the process
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tries to escape from some intervals. He shows that the power of the Dick-Fuller test to
reject the alternative hypothesis of stationarity is extremely low when the random walk
process is bounded. He concludes that such bounded processes follow a random walk
and can be, in effect, stationary. Also, he describes three properties of the bounded
random walk as follow. First, if a process is an unbounded random walk, the function
E[∆pt|pt−1 = x] = 0 for all x where ∆pt = pt − pt−1. On the other hand, if a process is
bounded and mean-reverting to Φ, the function E[∆pt|pt−1 = x] > 0 if x < Φ and < 0
if x > Φ. Secondly, the function E[∆pt|pt−1 = x] must satisfy following condition: (i)
must be zero in some interval; (ii) must be positive (negative) when x goes below (above)
some intervals; (iii) the reversion effect should be strong if x is far from the interval and
should be weak in the opposite case; and (iv) is differentiable to assure a smooth effect
of reversion. And last, the stationary distribution of a bounded random walk process is
flat in the middle interval and outside the interval there are strong reversions, so the tails
must not be heavy.
5.1.2 Stationarity in prediction markets
There are very few studies on the properties of prices in prediction markets even though
this subject has been widely explored in financial markets and for economic indices. In a
study of the ex-ante effect of the Iraq war on the US economy, Leigh et al. (2003) look at
the correlation of the contracts on the likelihood of ousting Saddam Hussein from power
on Tradesports and various economic indices such as oil prices, equity indices and so on.
A simple Dickey-Fuller test on the time series of contracts on various dates for the resig-
nation of Saddam cannot reject the null hypothesis of a random walk. The test simply
regresses the one-period price changes on its own lags. The coefficients in all contracts are
significant at 1%. This result is confirmed by the findings of the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test where the null hypothesis that the time series is stationary
around a deterministic trend is rejected in all contracts. Extending this to study whether
price changes are predictable based on historical data, they regress the change in the
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Saddam contracts’ prices on their own lags. They find that the change in the price is
negatively serial correlated. This can be explained by the bid and ask bounce - the result
of the bouncing of transaction prices back and forth from the bid side of the market to
the ask side as alternating buy and sell orders arrive. Institutively this happens because
the trading price is either ar the bid or ask (Roll, 1984). The prices in these markets are
also found to incorporate information from expert’s opinions after only short lags. These
findings suggest the absence of profitable trading strategies in that market and this is
complimentary to earlier work by Wolfers and Leigh (2002) suggesting that prices follow a
random walk in the 2001 Australian election markets and adding information contained
in polls does not yield profitable trades. Applying the same methodology, Leigh and
Wolfers (2006) test for the market efficiency of contracts predicting the 2004 Australian
election results in two online betting markets. In both markets, the null hypothesis of a
random walk cannot be rejected by the Dickey-Fuller test. Also, there is little evidence of
predictable price changes based on historical price patterns and publicly available polling
data. These findings are consistent with that found using the Saddam contacts. However,
according to the KPSS test, the hypothesis of trend stationarity is only rejected in one
market. The random walk hypothesis again cannot be rejected in a study of Forsythe
et al. (1992) as the result of a regression of expected market prices on their lagged prices
up to lag 2.
In a study of the properties of prices in prediction markets, Majumder et al. (2009) use
data from the US election markets in 2000 and 2004 in the Iowa Electronic Markets
and find mixed results in the distribution of returns. With regards to the Democratic
in 2000 contract and the Democratic and Republican in 2004 contracts, the distribution
of returns "decays in the tail as a power law". However, it decays as "an exponential
function with a characteristic decay scale" in the Republican in 2000 contract. Besides,
both unconditional and conditional volatility on given price of returns are higher toward
maturity date. Finally, the return distribution changes over time becoming wider at later
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days. Most studies on the price behavior are in the context of market efficiency. The
most famous bias is the "favourite-longshot bias" which is the tendency of overvaluing
the small probability and underestimate the more certain bet. The finding of this bias
is mixed. This bias has been documented for race-betting markets and sports betting
markets (Thaler and Ziemba, 1988; Gray and Gray, 1997) and in information markets
(Ziemba and Hausch, 1986; Jullien and Salanie, 2000). However, in the baseball betting
market the reverse longshot bias is found (Woodland and Woodland, 1994, 2001). The
second bias is overconfidence where one’s subjective evaluation of a commodity price is
higher than an objective value. This overconfidence bias is found in the tendency of
overreaction to private information in financial markets (Lichtenstein et al., 1982; Daniel
et al., 1998).
The two biases are both found in various prediction markets. Prices in the prediction
market appear to be biased by overconfidence but the long-shot bias appears in reverse in
a study of Berg and Rietz (2006, 2010) using data in IEM: Events that happen with low
frequency are underpriced, and vice versa. Initial trading prices appear relatively noisy
but unbiased. This is expected because in the initial stage little information is revealed.
Prices display an overconfidence bias at the intermediate horizon when some information
has come in but considerable uncertainty about the outcome still remains. The bias
gradually disappears as the maturity date approaches. Studying sport games contracts
in Tradesports, Tetlock (2004) find evidence of significant reverse favourite-longshot bias
and overreaction to information. Even though mispricings as a result of these biases
have been documented in financial markets, Tetlock argues that these inefficiencies in
information markets are not necessarily generalized to financial markets due to essential
differences in the structure of the two types of markets. Evidence of long-shot bias -
overvaluing the support of a candidate is found in a study of Erikson and Wlezien (2008)
and as a result, the market compounds its errors. This bias is consistent and is explained
by the degree of uncertainty about the event; while reading the information the market
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also incorporates considerable noise.
5.2 Expected property of prediction market prices
Empirical test for the stationarity property in prediction market should reflect the effect
of two features of prediction market prices. First, prices in prediction market represent
probability therefore are bounded within $0 and $1. This is the distinguishing feature
between prediction market prices and stock prices which do not have an upper bound.
According to EMH, if prices follow a random walk process, that is an evidence of market
efficiency (at least weak form). However, given that prediction market prices are bounded
both upward and downward, the random walk process is not feasible in general because
random walks are limitless with probability one as time goes to infinity. The process is
obviously bounded with reversion effects at upper and lower bounded levels. The lower
bound at $0 indicates that bad news would have no effect on prices as they are already
$0 because prices cannot go any lower than $0. Similarly is the price at the upper bound
of $1. According to properties of a bounded random walk process described by Nicolau
(2002) as above, prices in prediction markers are expected to show reversions toward
some interval when they approach $0 and $1.
If a random walk process have no limit then it is also a non-stationary process. On the
other hand, if it is bounded within a range then it only behaves like a random walk
within some intervals and show reversions toward those intervals as it escapes. Such
bounded random walk process then can be stationary. Accordingly, due to the limits at
$0 and $1, prices in the vote share market are expected to share the same properties as
bounded random walk process as described above and be stationary. However, the non-
negativity condition should not be considered a significant limit because it is broadly
common among financial and economic series like stock prices, interest rate, exchange
rate and so on which are used in previous studies and there is still ongoing debate on
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their stationary property. In fact, the upper bound at $1 should matter more because it
is a distinguishable feature of prediction market prices from other financial stock prices.
However, graphically examining the time series of prices in all eight contracts in the vote
share market, it is shown that prices never approach even close to the upper bound at
$1. National and Labour contract have the higher prices than the rest of contracts at
all time but their maxima is 55% and 38%, respectively. Therefore, the reversion effects
at the upper bound will not be significant in those contracts. Even in their presence,
my speculation is that they will not be able to dominate the random walk behavior ade-
quately to convert the non-stationarity to stationarity. Prices in the vote share market,
therefore, despite being bounded, are expected to follow a random walk model and be a
non-stationary process.
Second, the price process is expected to contain no deterministic elements (a constant
drift or time trends). A constant drift implies that prices are expected to change by a
certain amount in the next period. If prices fully reflect the market expectation then
there is no ground for them to do so. Also, there should not exist any trends in efficient
prices because they should effectively reflect information which is random and the arrival
of good news or bad news is independent of time.
Furthermore, prices ought to be non-stationary because what change is driven is new in-
formation which consequently changes the market’s expectation of the stock value. There
is no reason for information to have constant mean or variance or both over time. In fact,
it is generally common in stock markets that good (bad) news is often followed by another
good (bad) new. If this is true then prices have a tendency to diverge from its mean at
least until the period of optimistic (pessimistic) time is over. Also, the variance of prices
is determined by how good or bad new information is. News that either very good or
very bad tends to shift prices far away from it previous level and again there is no reason
for news to be broadly equally good or bad over a period of time. In general, if prices
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fully reflect new information then they should be a non-stationary process because the
arrival of new information is random and does not have constant mean or variance. In
prediction markets where prices are a direct interpretation of the likelihood of a future
outcome, information plays an important role in forming prices. Therefore, prediction
marker prices should also be non-stationary.
5.3 Testing prices for unit root
I use the Augmented Dick-Fuller (ADF) test for a unit root in a time series (Said and
Dickey, 1984). The ADF test statistic is a negative number. The more negative it is,
the stronger the rejection of the null hypothesis that there is a unit root at some level of
confidence. If the time series has a unit root then it is not stationary. The full model of
the test is as below:
∆pt = pt − pt−1 = α0 + γpt−1 + τt+
k∑
i=1
αi∆pt−i + t (5.1)
where p1, p2, ..., pN is the observed time series, t is the time index, α0 is an intercept con-
stant called a drift, τ represents a trend over time, γ is the coefficient presenting process
root, and the focus of testing, k is the lag order of the first-differences autoregressive
process, and t is an independent identically distributed residual term. Accordingly, the
null hypothesis of γ = 0 of non-stationarity is tested against the alternative hypothesis
γ < 0 of stationarity. The ADF technique applies an Ordinary Least Squares regression.
The p-values are interpolated from Table 4.2 in Banerjee et al. (1993).
The significance of γ is tested in three versions of Equation (5.1): (i) with the presence
of the deterministic elements α0 (a drift term) and τt (a linear time trend) and α0 6= 0
and τ 6= 0; (ii) without a drift α0 = 0; and (iii) without both deterministic elements,
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α0 = τ = 0.
The ADF test requires that the t be serially uncorrelated. Sufficient lags of ∆pt should
be added to ensure  is white noise. In theory, too few lags will leave autocorrelation in
the errors, while too many lags will reduce the power of the test statistic.
In this study, the number of lags k is determined by 3
√
(N − 1) = 3
√
(404− 1) ' 74 corre-
sponding to the suggested upper bound on the rate at which the number of lags should
be made to grow with the sample size for the general ARMA(p,q) setup.
The test procedure runs as follow (Enders, 2004). First, the null hypothesis of γ = 0 is
tested against the alternative of γ < 0 using the Equation (5.1). If the null is rejected then
the price series is concluded to have no unit root therefore is stationary. Otherwise, non-
stationarity cannot be concluded yet because the ADF test has very low power to reject.
The power of the test may be reduced due to the inclusion of deterministic elements.
Next the null hypothesis needs to be retested without those elements. Second, if the null
hypothesis is not rejected in step 1 then Equation (5.1) is rerun in the absence of the
time trend by setting τ = 0. The null hypothesis becomes τ = γ = 0 and the alternative
τ = 0 and γ < 0. If the null hypothesis is rejected then time trend is significant and
must be included in the model and the time series is a stationary process with a drift.
Otherwise the test is rerun without the drift term. Third, if the null hypothesis in step
2 is not rejected, it means that the time trend is not significant and should be excluded
by setting τ1 = 0. The null hypothesis now becomes α0 = γ = 0 and is tested against the
alternative of α0 = 0 and γ < 0. If the null is rejected then the drift is significant and
the time series is trend stationary process. Otherwise retest without any deterministic
elements. Last, if the null hypothesis in step 3 is not rejected then the model has no
deterministic elements where its equation looks like that of a random walk process.
4The data consists of 404 daily prices.
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∆pt = pt − pt−1 = γpt−1 +
k∑
i=1
αi∆pt−i + t
Test the above model for the null hypothesis of γ = 0 against γ < 0. If the null is rejected
then the time series is a stationary process; otherwise is stationary.
5.4 Empirical Results
The test procedure for stationarity described in Section 5.3 is applied to each of eight
contracts in the vote share market, using daily prices which are the last traded price. Be-
cause iPredict operates 24/7, in order to gather daily prices it is treated as being closed
at 23.50pm everyday including weekends. For days in which no transaction occurs, the
market is treated as closed and prices are taken from the close of the previous day to
ensure no gap in the data set. The vote share market was operated for 404 days so the
price time series in each contract has 404 observations. The expected properties of prices
in prediction markets discussed in detail in Section 5.3 can be summarized as follows.
Prices in prediction markets, on the one hand, should share same properties as those
in financial markets. Prices in stock markets have been found to be a non-stationary
process in previous empirical studies. On the other hand, while stock prices are not
bounded theoretically, especially upward, prices in prediction markers are bounded be-
tween $0 and $1 because they represent the expected probability. Nicolau (2002) shows
evidence through a simulation study that a random walk process which is bounded within
a certain interval can be stationary. Whether market prices in prediction markets behave
like stationary process depends on the effect of mean reversion as a result of the boundary.
There are a number of key features of the results reported in Table 5.1. First, the em-
pirical results of the unit root test in eight contracts in the vote share market show that
the non-stationarity cannot be rejected in seven out of eight contracts, except the Ma¯ori
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contract. The conclusion is reached in each contract after going through three steps in the
unit root test described in Section 5.3. This finding suggests that despite being bounded
within $0 and $1, prices in the vote share market still behave as a non-stationary process.
The effect of the mean reversion near the two limits is dominated by the behaviour of
the random walk when prices are far from the limits. As long as prices do not approach
the limits, the mean reverse effect does not take place. The iPredict contract prices are
similar to stock prices and indeed most economic indices in that they have a lower bound
of 0. As in Figure 5.1, in contracts of two major parties prices fluctuate within the middle
range (National prices varies within the range (42, 53) cents and Labour (26, 38) cents)
while prices of the rest of contracts vary at small level above zero. This implies that
for the National and Labour contracts, the reverse effect caused by the bounds is not
strongly present.
Second, in the Ma¯ori contract, prices obviously exhibit a pattern: prices have a decreas-
ing tendency over time which implies a negative correlation between prices and the time
to maturity (see Figure 5.2). The stationarity property of a constant mean cannot be
achieved; instead there exists a tendency of decreasing mean. Unsurprisingly, the formal
unit root test cannot reject the varying mean: The trend coefficient is -0.035 at the sig-
nificance level of 1.5%5. The failure of ADF test to reject the non-stationarity despite
the visual inspection may be the result of the cointegration of all prices in the entire vote
share markets: they sum up to $1. The Ma¯ori price is essentially the difference between
$1 and the aggregate price of the rest of seven contracts which is non-stationary due to
the varying mean. I suspect this additional constraint is a factor driving Ma¯ori prices to
the stationary side.
Another possible explanation is that the ADF test fails to reject the stationarity because
it only can detect varying mean. In other words, non-stationarity contributed by other
5Detrending by removing linear and exponential trends does not change the test result.
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factors such as varying variance is beyond the scope of ADF test. This means that the
Ma¯ori prices are not an I(1) process but still can br non-stationary. In terms of market
efficiency, the stationarity found in the Ma¯ori prices implies that trading in this contract
is driven by something else other than information and this element dominates the effect
of information. It may be the bias in trading or personal political (in)preference toward
Ma¯ori no matter what the information is.
Third, the trend coefficient α1 and its standard error are very small in all contracts there-
fore are not included. Fourth, time trend and constant drift are statistically insignificant
in seven out of eight contracts, except the Ma¯ori contract.
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Figure 5.1: iPredict market-based forecast of 2011 General Election vote share
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Figure 5.2: iPredict market-based forecast of the Ma¯ori contract
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Chapter 6
Relationship Between Market Prices
and Opinion Polls
The intuition of the causality between the poll results and the prediction market prices
is as follows: While participants in prediction markets are provided with an incentive to
gather information from many sources to help improve their forecast which subsequently
revealed in their trading, respondents in opinion polls are simply expected to reveal their
own political preferences without taking into account how others will vote. This is the
foundation for the hypothesis that traders may consider information contained in polls
and therefore poll results have influence on market prices. According to this hypothesis
traders, in an attempt to comprehend the voters’ assessment of information, will make
trades based on the latest poll results. One should expect reported opinion polls to affect
market prices only if they contain news that has not been anticipated or incorporated
by traders or convey different interpretation of news by the voting population. In other
words, market traders have incorrectly assessed respondents’ preferences (as a proxy for
the preferences of the electorate as a whole) and their interpretation of information. The
release of the opinion poll results allows market traders to correct any incorrect expecta-
tion.
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However, it should be noted that while this interpretation is consistent with ascribing
inefficiency on the part of prediction market traders, it also relies on an assumption that
respondents’ preferences are already public information. If poll respondents’ preferences
are not public information and this is newly revealed in the opinion poll then an effi-
cient prediction market should react to the new information. Arguably this should only
matter when a new poll is reported. Ongoing polls, especially where these are polls of
the same respondents over time, should be less subject to this being new information.
That said, question marks over the consistency and potential bias of polls may indicate
that the information in polls cannot be relied upon to reflect a consistent and genuinely
representative sample of voters.
Alternatively, if polls do not provide new information at all but only confirm what traders
can gather from other sources then there should be no significant reaction to the poll
release. In theory, the responses in opinion polls are based on public information. Non-
reaction of the prediction market to an opinion poll is consistent with the hypothesis that
the public information that influences the information interpretation of poll’s respondents
is already taken into account by market traders. If this alternative hypothesis is accepted
then this would support a finding of the semi-strong form of market efficiency. A lack
of reaction by a prediction market to an opinion poll would also be consistent with the
market heavily discounting the poll result. Given the questions that have been raised
over whether some opinion polls are truly representative, it is also possible that market
traders do not trust the poll results and thus ignore them. Technically the market traders
are treating polls as if they contain no new information.
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6.1 Description of Roy Morgan polls
The main four opinion polls for the 2011 General Election were Television New Zealand,
ONE News Colmar Brunton, The New Zealand Herald and Roy Morgan Research. Among
them I can only gather sufficient data to support the empirical analysis from Roy Morgan
Research because its poll results are available publicly on their website1 and newsletters.
Other pollsters do not release their poll results on a sufficiently regular basis and also
do not provide sufficient details on the results in order for them to be as reliable as a
comparator to iPredict. Therefore I will mainly use Roy Morgan’s poll results to compare
with the forecast of iPredict’s vote share market.
Roy Morgan Research is the only Australian-owned independent polling company that
is not owned by a media organization. It has been conducting opinion polls on voting
intention by telephone with a New Zealand wide cross-section and reporting the result
fortnightly since August 18, 2005. Electors are asked a same question: "If a New Zealand
Election were held today, which party would receive your party vote?". Although Roy Mor-
gan polls on voting intention have been conducted long before the launching of iPredict’s
vote share market, I only use the poll results released between November 2, 2010 and
December 10, 2011 which is the launching and close date of iPredict’s vote share market
respectively. Their opinion polls are not conducted on a strict regular basis; the interval
between opinion polls varies from 5 days (the last polls before the announcement of the
election’s results) and 35 days (Christmas and New Year break) and on average is 15 days.
The sample is chosen randomly and interviews are made by telephone. The sample size
of the voting intention poll is usually around 1000. Responses not naming a party are
excluded from the data to ensure the forecast of vote share received by all parties sums
to 100%. The population estimate is the number of votes cast which is 2,237,464 2. The
1http://www.roymorgan.com
2 http://www.electionresults.govt.nz/electionresults_2011/e9/html/e9_part1.html
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samples are weighted based on the latest Census (RoyMorgan, 2011).
The margin of error depends on the sample size (i.e. the number of respondents) and the
population size (i.e. the number of eligible votes) (Moon, 1999a). Roy Morgan publishes
the margin of error for their estimates as in Table 6.1. This gives 95% confidence interval
expressed as the number of percentage points above or below the actual estimate. The
error margin corrected for an estimate of a proportion ( ˆPoll) is:
Margin of error ME( ˆPoll) = Critical value x Standard error( ˆPoll)
where the critical value for 95% confidence interval depends on the assumption of the
distribution of Poll. The proportion Poll is binomial and due to the independent and
large sample, the estimate ˆPoll is normally distributed. Therefore, the critical value
corrected for finite population is 1.96. The standard error of ˆPoll is:
SE( ˆPoll) =
√
N − n
N − 1
√
ˆPoll(100− ˆPoll)
n
(6.1)
where N is the population size (2,237,464) and n is the sample size (1,000).
Table 6.1: The margin of error published by Roy Morgan polls3
Sample size Percentage Estimate pˆ
40%-60% 25% or 75% 10% or 90% 5% or 95%
1,000 ±3.4 ±2.7 ±1.9 ±1.4
In order to understand the importance of the error margin to the performance of an
forecast, consider an example. Roy Morgan’s poll results reported on November 24, 2011
shows National 49.5% and ACT 1.5%. Reading from the table, the actual margin of er-
ror and 95% confidence interval for National are 3.4% and (46.3%,52.7%). The predicted
1.5% of ACT does not fall into any estimate range given in the table so it is calculated
manually by the formula ; the actual margin of error and 95% confidence interval for
ACT are 0.75% and (0.75%,2.25%). The larger the estimate, the larger the error margin
3http://www.roymorgan.com/news/polls/2011/4724/
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all other things being the same.
Leigh and Wolfers (2006) point out an issue with the published poll’s error margin in their
study of the relative performance of prediction markets and polls for the 2004 Australian
election. Looking at the time series of various polls, they found an extreme volatility in
the forecasts suggested by polls. They consider the excess volatility as an indicator of an
underestimate of the true forecast errors. The extreme volatility raised questions about
the predictive accuracy of poll’s forecasts and the authors suggest that the pollsters’ pub-
lished margins of error should be at least doubled.
Figure 6.1 shows the Roy Morgan polls’ implied forecast within the lifetime of iPredict’s
vote share market.
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Figure 6.1: Roy Morgan’s opinion poll results
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Note: The horizontal axix shows the release date of poll’s release date.
A strong surge in the support to the Green party since the poll released on October 31,
2011 is noticed and it continued until the official election results. This increase in support
to the Green party came at the cost of the support to the two major parties National
and Labour. During that period, supports to the National and Labour parties dropped
significantly, especially for the Labour. This can be seen in Figure 6.2 comparing the
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poll results of the Green party and that of the combination of the National and Labour
parties. The last few weeks before the official results were announced also observed a
strong increase in the support to the New Zealand First party.
Figure 6.2: Comparing the poll results of the Green party and that of the sum of the
National and Labour parties
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6.2 Differences of forecasts implied by iPredict’s prices
and opinion polls
Typically, opinion polls are designed to evaluate public opinion at a single point in time.
Even though prediction market prices and opinion polls are in principle comparable as
they seek to forecast the same goal - an election result - they are distinguishable in many
aspects. Their differences have been discussed in detail in studies of McGirr and Salmond
(2010) and Erikson and Wlezien (2008). I review and further develop their discussion as
below.
First, what mainly differentiates polls from prediction markets is the form of the ques-
tions asked. While prediction markets aim to aggregate what people expect will happen
by asking a question in the form of "What share of the party vote will the (name) Party
win at the 2011 election?", polls reveal current personal voting preferences by asking the
question "If a New Zealand Election were held today, which party would receive your party
vote?". The former seeks to aggregate individual investors’ knowledge of other people’s
voting preferences and should not rely on their own personal preference. Whereas an
answer to the poll question simply reveals the respondent’s party preference without con-
sidering what anyone else’s preferences are. One may vote for Green and hope Green
would win the 2011 election but rationally would not buy Green shares in iPredict at a
very high price.
Second, there is a difference in the time frame of the focus between traders in iPredict
and respondents in opinion poll results. The market prediction is forward looking and
relates to expectations of the voting patterns on a future election day. Prediction mar-
kets can look ahead and explicitly project the future outcome. In contrast, the opinion
polls are about current voting preference, the pollsters pose a question seeking for the
public opinion at the time polls are conducted, not expected opinion at an election in
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the future. They aggregate public opinion for an election at the time of the interview.
Polls are not explicitly trying to predict the election results on the election day; instead
they are trying to aggregate the public support at a particular point in time. From a
point of view of a pollster, a poll should be interpreted as a reading of how the voters
would vote if an election was held that day, and not as a forecast of an election sometime
in the future. That purpose is reflected in the question asked by pollsters as mentioned
earlier: "If a New Zealand Election were held today, which party would receive your party
vote?". Nevertheless, this does not eliminate the use of poll results as a forecast and in
fact polls have been used widely to help predict what is likely to happen on the election
day by media and journalists. Forsythe et al. (1992) argue that even though pollster asks
"In the election who do you think you will vote for?", the respondent’s answer will be
unchanged under the assumption of truthful revelation of preferences. An individual’s
political preference may change when new information arise and therefore he will vote
differently. However, given the information available up to current time, the current pref-
erence is the best forecast of the voting behaviour in the future. The chance of changing
their preference due to the arrival of new information just reflect the forecast error. In
contrast, David and Justin (2012) compare the predictive performance of opinion polls
when respondents are asked for their expectation of the election’s outcome instead of
their personal voting intention and find that the expectation-based questions yield much
more accurate predictions of election outcomes.
Furthermore, both poll respondents and market traders will have information regarding
future events (for instance, an announcement of a large tax cut). If poll respondents are
completely honest about their response, they should reveal the way they would like to
vote at the time being asked and not be influenced by their expectations of a policy that
has not taken place yet. In practice, those expectations may affect the current voting
intention. If the preferences of poll respondents are influenced by expectation about fu-
ture events then they are using the same information set as market traders. In this case,
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information incorporated in polls should be similar to what in market prices; however,
the way in which the information is interpreted may differ between poll respondents and
market traders. Obviously, this is highly dependent on the certainty attached to the
upcoming event. If little is known about the event or the respondent attaches a very
low probability to it, then it may be effectively discounted to the point where it has no
influence on current preferences.
Third, iPredict allows 24/7 trading so market prices can reflect new information immedi-
ately. Whereas the opinion polls are conducted at discreet time intervals thus there is a
potential delay for new information to be reflected in polls. This delay further contributes
to the chance poll results may be out of date as mentioned previously. Further, the fact
that the interview process of polling takes place over a number of days and the process of
analysing the responses may worsen the delay of the incorporation of new information.
At the time a poll is reported, its content consists of aggregated information gathered
at different time which may produce an inconsistency of time window in the data. This
implies a disadvantage of polls in the competition with prediction markets as forecast
tools of election results: a chance to report out-of-date forecast due to the time window
between the time of interview; i.e. the time associated with the revelation of information
and the time of reporting the poll’s result. Therefore, there is a chance that public opin-
ion is changing while the poll is taking place so that the pollster’s final results may be
out of date before they are even reported.
Last, relative to polls, prediction markets rely on very different mechanisms for data
collection and aggregation. With an opinion poll, the sample is meant to be broadly rep-
resentative of the voting population for it to be able to reflect accurately the population’s
preferences. On that basis, the sample is chosen randomly but within certain constraints
in order to achieve the representativeness. This contrasts with prediction markets in
which the investors need not be similarly representative of the electors. While the poll
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results are a sample, the iPredict prices are the population and the traders are inter-
ested in the population voting shares while the sample is an indicator of this. Traders
in prediction markets gather information from many sources including information con-
tained in opinion polls. Prediction markets do not rely on a representative sample or
even honest beliefs or rational trade from all market participants. Instead, prices can
reach their efficient level if there is a small group of marginal traders who are motivated
by profits and invest in accurate prediction and trade accordingly. Indeed, self-selection
of investors means that investors are likely to be unrepresentative of the electorate as a
whole. According to a survey conducted by iPredict, traders in iPredict are overwhelm-
ingly male (90% male), well-educated (40% have an undergraduate university degree or
higher), having high income (median personal income is NZ$75,000), and young (average
age is 35). Also, iPredict does not require traders to be eligible to vote in the election.
These stylized facts of traders in iPredict are consistent with Iowa Electronic Market
whose traders are also more educated, have higher household income, more often white
and male than both US citizens and votes on average. What drives traders’ behaviour is
not their own preferences but their ability to gather and accurately process information
about the preferences of the electors. Thus if investors’ information includes all the infor-
mation held by the poll respondents, their trading behaviour should be consistent with
opinion poll responses. However, it is also possible that traders may use polls but make a
better interpretation of information revealed in polls. In that case, polls help the market
to see how other people interpret information about events and give market participants
an opportunity to compare their personal interpretation of information with others’.
The market included 664 traders; however, apparently the movement of prices is deter-
mined mainly by a small group of traders who dominate trading trading volume in terms
of the number of trades and shares traded. Chart on the left of Figure 6.3 show the pro-
portion of trading volume of individual traders and it is obvious that a group of a dozen
traders takes up almost 50% of the entire market. Indeed, only 6 traders are responsible
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for around half of all transactions. Most notably, a single trader takes up a quarter. The
right hand side of Figure 6.3 also shows how the majority of traders are individually very
small traders. This feature distinguishes the difference in the mechanism of prediction
markets and opinion polls whose predicative accuracy depends crucially on the represen-
tativeness of the sample.
Figure 6.3: Trading activity by traders
Proportion of transactions by individual trader
48%
25%
17%
9%
Proportion of traders by transaction
<0.02%
0.02−0.05%
0.05−0.15%
>0.15%
Min.    1st Qu.  Median  Mean    3rd Qu.  Max.
0.00     0.01       0.02      0.15     0.05       23.36 
% of total transaction
Proportion of shares by individual trader
49%
20%
22%
9%
Proportion of traders by share
<0.03%
0.03−0.09%
0.09−0.15%
>0.15%
Min.    1st Qu.  Median  Mean    3rd Qu.  Max.
0.00     0.00       0.03      0.15     0.09       12.42 
% of total transaction
Proportion of values by individual trader
35%
39%
13%
13%
Proportion of traders by value
<0.01%
0.01−0.05%
0.05−0.15%
>0.15%
Min.    1st Qu.  Median  Mean    3rd Qu.  Max.
0.00     0.00       0.01      0.15     0.05       25.25 
% of total transaction
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Conceptually, aside from the timeframe difference, polls and markets should be equiva-
lent. In particular, they both operate from the same set of publicly available information.
This is also based on the assumption that polls are representative and do not have any
inherent bias. To the extent that polls are not truly representative, the bias may well
affect the extent to which information is reflected in the poll result. For instance, a
poll sample that under-represents a proportion of voters that are adversely affected by
a party’s policies may overstate its support. Prediction market traders face an incentive
to take into account the effect of policies including the proportion of voters likely to be
affected.
6.3 The accuracy of iPredict’s election market and
Roy Morgan Research’s opinion polls
6.3.1 Definition of predictive accuracy
The predictive accuracy represents the extent to which a predictor correctly identifies
an actual event. In a wide range of empirical studies, a forecast error measuring the
spread between the market price at a specific time and the expiry value has been applied
as an estimator of the predictive accuracy. The comparison of absolute forecast error is
conducted at various times prior to the settlement date. For a part vote share contract
in iPredict, the accuracy is determined by the extent to which the contract price differs
from the official result. By definition, the forecast error can only be measured once the
actual outcome is revealed. It implies that the accuracy defined by the forecast error
does not reflect how close the market forecast is to the current voting preferences of the
population which is a random variable and varies over the time prior to the Election Day.
The formal definition of forecast error (FE) is as below:
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FEt,i = pt,i − pT,i (6.2)
where pt,i is the market price at time t in contract i and pT,i is contract i’s payout value.
By definition, FE equals 0 at expiry. In order for prediction markets to generate accurate
forecast at each point in time FE is optimally low or zero.
The average forecast error (AFE) is used in the comparison across contracts during a
period of time (number of transactions = N).
AFEt=[x,y],i =
∑t=y
t=x(pt,i − pT,i)
N
(6.3)
Efficiency and accuracy are distinct concepts because their definition relate to two dif-
ferent variables. The degree of efficiency in the vote share markets depends on how well
prices can incorporate information of the contemporaneous voting preference to the fu-
ture election of the population which is a random variable, unobservable and varies over
the time. For that reason, efficient prices should be a random variable and fluctuate
over time to reflect the arrival of new information. Accuracy, on the other hand, is a
measurement of how close the contract price matches the actual outcome. There is only
one actual outcome which is observed on the expiry day and fixed. Accuracy therefore
can only be measured ex-post.
However, if market efficiency is concerned with the extent to which risk-free trading op-
portunities occur, accuracy and efficiency are related. Efficiency in a frictionless market
first requires the non-existence of arbitrage opportunities. In an efficient prediction mar-
kets prices reflect all relevant information and then are unbiased and the best predictor
of the underlying event. Clearly an inefficient market where the aggregate contract prices
are significant different from $1 cannot be completely accurate - at least one contract
must be incorrectly priced. Conversely, an efficient market needs not be accurate in that
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two contracts may be incorrectly priced (biased) but exactly offset each other so that
they still add up to $1.
6.3.2 Literature review
Campbell (1996) find that polls predicting the vote share of presidential elections in the
US during 1948-1992 has the mean of absolute forecast error is 3.52% five months prior,
2.14% two months prior and 1.79% in the last poll. Wolfers and Leigh (2002) calcu-
late Roy Morgan poll’s average error during 1987-1998 is 1.4% on election eve, 2.4% one
moth prior, 1.5% three months prior, 3.9% one year prior (based on Australian elections).
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) also use the mean absolute error as a measurement of accu-
racy as comparing market’s forecasts with that of surveys in the prediction of economic
indices. Kou and Sobel (2004) instead use Mean Square Forecast Error but consider this
not to change the assessment of relative performance of alternative forecast tools. They
derive a model with an underlying assumption that the poll results are in the information
set used by market participants and prove that for every given point in time the market
prices produce forecast that is more accurate than opinion polls because the Mean Square
Forecast Error of polls comprises of that of market prices plus systematic measurement
errors in the polls. Furthermore, they prove by their model that the market exhibits
less volatility than polls under the assumption that the preferences are less volatile on
Election Day than at any other time. Berg and Rietz (2006) show that the accuracy of
IEM election markets for the vote share since 1988 has the average absolute percentage
error on the election eve is 1.33% while polls for election prior to 2014 yield error average
of 2%. Diemer and Poblete (2010) compare the relative accuracy of play-money contracts
versus real-money contracts in iPredict and find that overall play-money contracts pro-
duce more statistically significant accuracy: play-money market’s mean of forecast error
is 13.9% while real-money’s is 18.7%. However, in a direct comparison of the same events,
the real-money markets outperform. The forecast errors are 18% on average overall and
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show significant skewness: high density for trading activity at low forecast error. The
accuracy is found to depend on incentives, specific contracts and volumes. They also find
a negative correlation between days to expiry and number of trades: the trading volume
is higher as the expiry date draws closer, a negative correlation between the number of
order volumes and accuracy: a low number of high-volume trading occurrences are more
accurate than a high number of risk-adverse trades involving low volumes and a positive
correlation between the mean of forecast errors and the days to expiry.
McGirr and Salmond (2010) study the predictive performance of various opinion polls
and two prediction markets (iPredict - using real money and New Zealand Political Stock-
market - using virtual money) in the 2008 New Zealand General Election. They find that
pollsters produced conflicting results in two aspects. One is their substantial disagree-
ment about the level of support for the National Party which is explained by the influence
sample bias has on their poll results. TVNZ and The New Zealand Herald are suggested
by the authors as having a sample bias in favour of the National Party and they both
produced the highest level of support for National. The opposite pattern was found in
the forecast of Roy Morgan. Second, short-term shifts in major parties’ expected vote
share did not appear consistently across pollsters. This is explained as a result of sam-
pling error rather than the actual movements in public opinion. Of the two prediction
markets it was iPredict, the prediction market with real money which worked better and
outperformed polls in picking the correct winners. The performance of the virtual money
market was poorest among all forecast channels. These conclusions are drawn from the
comparison of the forecast errors on the election eve and for the whole period for 6 months
prior. Interestingly, the study also suggests that traders in prediction markets are sub-
ject to bias in aggregation. iPredict’s observed tendency of overestimating the National
Party’s support is explained by the fact that real money prediction market attract peo-
ple with high income. The opposite tendency is observed in NZ Political Stockmarket
which overestimates the support for Labour party and is explained by the fact the vir-
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tual money prediction markets tend to attract people with less income. An implication
of this phenomenon is an evidence of trading bias in both prediction markets - an indi-
vidual’s income determines his voting preferences and is reflected in his trading behaviour.
The better performance of prediction markets over opinion polls is also evident in the
1988 US presidential election market (IEM) (Forsythe et al., 1992). The same conclu-
sion is drawn in 2001 Australian Federal elections when the prediction market selected
the correct winners more often than opinion polls (Wolfers and Leigh, 2002; Leigh and
Wolfers, 2006). Berg et al. (2000, 2001) and Berg and Rietz (2006) show that daily prices
contain only half the forecast error of the daily polls (IEM). Poll results appear to be
more volatile than market prices (Leigh and Wolfers, 2006; Berg and Rietz, 2006; Forsythe
et al., 1992), certainly more than can be attributed to sampling error alone. Chen et al.
(2005) apply two different methods of aggregating expert’s opinions (linear and logarith-
mic) and compare their forecast on the outcomes of 2003 US National Football League
games with that implied by prediction markets and find that the market’s forecast is as
accurate or more accurate than pooled opinions. Kou and Sobel (2004) propose a theo-
retical justification for using market prices which is to use the market equilibrium price
instead of the actual price as the market-based forecast. They find that even though the
market forecast does not dominate that of polls in general, they prove that the market
outperforms polls if the information contained in polls is included in the information set
possessed by market participants. Other studies agree on the same idea that market beat
polls include Caldeira (2004); Sunstein (2005) and Surowiecki (2004).
In contrast, Erikson and Wlezien (2008) show that historically market participants can
profit by exploiting information contained in the opinion polls. Interestingly, Erikson and
Wlezien (2008); Rhode and Strumpf (2004) use the election eve prices of markets in the
period during and before the advent of opinion polls and find that the predictive perfor-
mance of market is affected by the availability of polls: before polling, the market worked
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remarkably well. However, following the introduction of polls, market prices heavily re-
flected the polls and did not add information beyond polls (Erikson and Wlezien, 2012).
Erikson and Wlezien (2008) propose an method to transform a poll result which is sup-
posed to reflect the public opinion on the day polls are conducted to a forecast (called
projected polls) for what will happen on the election day on the future. While in most
other studies, data from poll results are recorded on their release date, Erikson and
Wlezien (2008)’s poll data are reported in terms of the beginning and end of the polling
period. They lag the poll’s projection two days, i.e. they treat each poll as being released
two days after the final date in the period of interview and process. They provide no
explanation why the use of polls lagging two days from the final date of polling is chosen.
6.3.3 Comparison of forecast error
Since market prices vary continuously, the question arises of which price to take as the
prediction from the market. Berg et al. (2000) suggest to weight market prices according
to their trading volume (i.e. the number of shares associated with each trade). Table 6.2
compares the forecast errors of Roy Morgan’s polls and iPredict’s volume weighted aver-
age price on the release day of the last poll (November 23, 2011). Across all contracts, the
average poll error is 12.12% while that of the market is 6.61%. The market outperforms
the opinion polls in major parties (National, Labour, and Green), being similar in small
parties except for the New Zealand First and ACT in which polls predict better.
A prediction on a single day is less rich than predictions over the full course of the cam-
paign. Figures 6.4 - 6.8 compare the market prediction with that of opinion polls for
the individual parties over the course of the campaign. There is a general tendency for
the market and the opinion polls to converge to election outcomes over the time but the
market prediction appear to be more stable than those of polls. The exception to this
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Table 6.2: Forecast errors of Roy Morgan polls and iPredict’s prices on November 24,
2011 (%)
General Elec-
tion 2011
National Labour Green NZ
First
ACT Ma¯ori United
Future
Others Sum*
Official Results1 47.31 27.48 11.06 6.59 1.07 1.43 0.60 4.46 100
Roy Morgan
Poll2
49.50 23.50 14.50 6.50 1.50 1.00 0.50 3.00 100.00
iPredict prices3 47.16 28.35 11.92 4.22 2.37 1.21 0.75 3.77 99.75
Error of Roy
Morgan4
2.19 -3.98 3.44 -0.09 0.43 -0.43 -0.10 -1.46 12.12
Error of iPredict5 -0.15 0.87 0.86 -2.37 1.30 -0.22 0.15 -0.69 6.61
* Sum of absolute values
3 Volume-weighted prices
4 (4) = (3) - (1)
5 (5) = (4) - (1)
are the ACT and United Future contracts in which the market diverges from the actual
outcomes more often and by a greater extent than opinion polls. Also, prices in those
markets exhibit significant volatility. Nevertheless, over the full course, the markets are
more accurate and stable than polls. This emphasises the value of the markets as long
run forecast devices. iPredict outperformed the opinion polls in six out of eight con-
tracts but did poorly especially in the New Zealand First contract when comparing the
forecast error over the full course (see Table 6.3). McGirr and Salmond (2010) studying
the 2008 NZ Election find that iPredict’s average error immediately prior election day is
15.7% and 25.8% over the whole campaign. Those of Roy Morgan polls are 20.8% and
36.8%, respectively. In this study of the 2011 Election, iPredict’s error was 1.35% on the
election-eve, and 17.17% during the full course. Roy Morgan polls’ errors were 12.12%
on the last poll and 19.74% during the entire course. Both iPredict and Roy Morgan
have apparently improved their predictive performance since the previous election but
iPredict continues to produce better forecast in general.
Table 6.3: Forecast errors of Roy Morgan polls and iPredict’s prices over the full course(%)
Error National Labour Green NZ
First
ACT Ma¯ori United
Future
Others Sum*
Roy Morgan 4.54 3.98 3.04 0.59 0.93 0.22 3.19 3.25 19.74
iPredict 1.88 3.93 2.97 2.85 0.60 1.08 1.97 1.89 17.17
* Sum of absolute errors
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Most studies on predictive power of prediction markets use some form of graphical ex-
amination to look for patterns in the time trend of both forecasts. The time trend of two
forecasts are used to look for any apparent trend of overestimating or underestimating
the support for the underlying party candidate (McGirr and Salmond, 2010; Berg et al.,
2001; Forsythe et al., 1992). Leigh and Wolfers (2006) graphically examine the reaction of
both opinion polls and market prices to specific events and conclude that prices respond
quickly to news and different polls appear to respond in similar ways to market prices. The
graphical examination in those studies reach one agreement on the degree of volatility in
polls: poll results are more volatile than market prices and are conflicting among various
pollsters. They state that this volatility cannot be explained by the sampling error solely.
Visual inspection of Figures 6.4 - 6.11 graphing the forecast implied by iPredict and opin-
ion polls has a number of key suggestions. The poll overpredicted the actual outcome and
market prices all the time in the National contract which suggests a bias in poll results.
The bias could be resulted from the poll sampling. The poll’s sample is ideally to be
chosen randomly but at the same time to be a representative of the voting population.
The overprediction in the poll results may result from a skew in the sample in National’s
favour. Furthermore, market prices and polls appear to reveal conflicting information
about the change in the support toward the National party in that the two series do not
follow each other. This is reflected in the low correlation of 0.23. The positivity of the
correlation of market prices and opinion polls may be flawed due to the small sample4.
In contrast, the opinion polls and market prices appear to follow the same trend in the
Labour, Green and ACT contracts. However, when the polls and market prices for the
Labour and Green contracts produce the same predictions, prices in the ACT contract
exhibit a considerable difference with poll results. Also, no similar trend is observed in the
contract of the New Zealand First, Ma¯ori, United Future party and the Other contract.
Plus, market prices did a poor job predicting the support to the United Future contract:
4Due to the difference in time interval, the correlation of market prices and polls is calculated by
matching prices and poll results on the poll’s release date. As a result, the sample size is only 27.
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overpredicting the actual result all the time. And the similar observation may be made
with regards to the ACT contract. In general, the visual inspection shows mixed results
of which tools produces the better forecast but market prices experienced less volatility.
The correlation of market prices and poll results is positive in all contracts, except for
the rest of vote share (negative but very small), and particularly strong in Labour, Green
and NZ First.
Figure 6.4: Forecast of the National’s vote share by iPredict and opinion polls
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Figure 6.5: Forecast of the Labour’s vote share by iPredict and opinion polls
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Figure 6.6: Forecast of the Green’s vote share by iPredict and opinion polls
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Figure 6.7: Forecast of the New Zealand First’s vote share by iPredict and opinion polls
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Figure 6.8: Forecast of the ACT’s vote share by iPredict and opinion polls
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Figure 6.9: Forecast of the Ma¯ori’s vote share by iPredict and opinion polls
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Figure 6.10: Forecast of the United Future’s vote share by iPredict and opinion polls
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Figure 6.11: Forecast of the rest of the vote share by iPredict and opinion polls
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6.4 Literature Review
Page (2008) propose a theoretical way to transform a poll into a market price of a binary
contract5under the assumption that opinion polls are the only available relevant informa-
tion to the election. The formula yields that the price depends on the probability that
the current proportion of votes for the underlying candidate is greater than 50% and on
the volatility of voters’ change of mind.
Erikson and Wlezien (2008) set up a hypothetical market whose prices are determined by
poll results and a robot trades against the market at offers derived from the actual market
prices. If the robot can produce a profit then market prices contain superior information
beyond polls and vice versa. They find a 50% chance of the robot making a profit which
implies that market prices do not provide a better forecast than polls.
The relationship between market prices and opinion polls is tested by a formal model in
Forsythe et al. (1992). In their model, the market price is determined by its previous
values up to lag 2 and the difference of the actual poll result and its expected value
conditional on the current information set.
pt = α0 + α1pt−1 + α2pt−2 + β[Pollt − Et(Pollt|φt−1)]Dt + ut (6.4)
where pt is the market price on day t, φt−1 is all information available prior to time t,
Pollt is an opinion poll’s result released on day t, Dt is a dummy variable which takes on
the value 1 or 0 according to whether a new poll is released on day t and ut is white noise.
The anticipated poll result is determined by preceding poll results plus the cumulative
response of the market to any news that has arrived since the last poll.
Et(Pollt|φt−1) = γo + γ1Pollt−s + γ2(pt−1 − pt−s) (6.5)
5A binary contract pays $1 of and only if a specific event occurs and 0 otherwise.
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For each contract, the model is estimated in two versions: the constrained model when
β = 0 and the unconstrained when β 6= 0. In the constrained model, poll results are
irrelevant to market participants (as the information in the poll is assumed to be already
incorporated into the information set available to market participants) and Equation (6.4)
collapses to:
pt = α0 + α1pt−1 + α2pt−2 + ut
The estimate of γ1 represents the extent to which the previous poll result influences the
current poll. Thus if γ1 was close to zero, it would indicate that previous polling has little
bearing on the likely outcome of the current poll. In contrast, a significant value would
indicate the opposite. As mentioned above, it is unlikely that poll results reflect infor-
mation contained in prediction market prices. The market prices embody participants’
aggregation of information including the voting preferences of non market participants.
In contrast, poll respondents are expected to truthfully reveal their personal voting inten-
tion without consideration of what other voters may vote. Forsythe et al. (1992) find that
the null hypothesis β = 0 implying that the information contained in polls has no effect
on market prices is not rejected at any significance level. The hypothesis that correlation
coefficients cannot be zero α1 = α2 = 0 is rejected and in addition one cannot reject
α1 = 0 at 5%; this is a weak evidence that market prices follow a random walk.
There is an issue with Forsythe et al. (1992)’s model and results. The regression analysis
appears to be a relatively simple linear regression. However, it ignores the potential
complications that arise from regression of non-stationary variables which will affect the
significance of the estimates. More important, the non-stationary property is expected
to be present in the market price level. Forsythe et al. (1992) do not indicate whether
any tests for non-stationarity (including unit root tests) have been undertaken. Indeed,
the graph of prices in Bush’s contract (Figure 6.12) plotting the market prices and the
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corresponding polling results shows significant upward trends. This is not to say that
these trends are not reflective of the same underlying factors, in which case the common
trend is reasonable. Nevertheless, there still exists the possibility that the two series are
affected by different factors that impart distinct trends: the two series can be correlated
if trended by the same factor. This would lead to a spurious regression. Arguably it
would be appropriate to transform the series (via, for instance, detrending or differencing)
which would eliminate the potential for spurious regression. In fact, the stationary test
conducted in this study using iPredict’s data of markets predicting the 2011 General
Election in New Zealand provides empirical evidences that market prices are indeed non-
stationary processes. This implies that the regression equation (6.4) will produce spurious
results unless an estimation procedure that recognises that they are stationary is used.
For those time series of market prices whose non-stationary property is found as in the
vote share market in iPredict, a different approach to analyze the causality must be taken.
Figure 6.12: Graph of Bush’ prices in IEM
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In the same attempt to study the causality between poll results and market prices, Leigh
and Wolfers (2006) use a different approach: a formal test whose hypothesis is that market
price changes are predictable on the basis of publicly available polling data. It regresses
price changes on the changes of latest poll results. The regression equation is:
∆pt = β1∆Pollt−1 + β2∆Pollt−2 + β3∆Pollt−3
The test is implemented in two prediction markets in Australia and produces different
results of the same event. In one market, the coefficients are small and statistically
insignificant suggesting that the market incorporates information contained in polls ef-
ficiently. In the other, the coefficients are also small but jointly significant suggesting
some lags in the information incorporation. However, it is insufficient to create profitable
opportunities by exploiting the serial correlation in market prices. Leigh and Wolfers
(2006)’s equation has the same issue with that of Forsythe et al. (1992): without a con-
firmation of the stationary property of price changes, their model is exposed to the risk
of the spurious regression problem.
6.5 Testing Models and Results
Poll results once reported in media or in a pollster’s newsletter become publicly avail-
able information. The test for the existence of the causality relationship between market
prices and poll results is likely to entail a one-way effect of information contained in polls
on the change in market prices. An efficient market, at least at semi-strong form, should
expect to find no such effect: if information revealed in opinion polls is anticipated by
traders then the release of a poll result will not affect market prices. In other word, polls
do not provide information beyond what is already reflected in market prices.
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A formal test of the relationship between opinion polls and market prices requires a model
of market price changes. Its first purpose is to examine the degree of market efficiency.
Efficiency in the context of a single market usually implies that prices follow a random
walk and that the change in prices should not be predictable (otherwise it would be pos-
sible to consistently take a speculative positions that earn a supernormal profit). This
further implies no pattern in the price changes, i.e. no serial correlation with its own lags
or no sources of external information can help to predict the movement of changes in the
price. The second purpose is to provide a model to test for the influence of opinion polls
on the market prices. In an informationally efficient market, market price changes are
independent to opinion polls.
In order to avoid the spurious regression problem, the validity of any models requires that
changes in market prices follow a stationary process. Theoretically the change in poll’s
results is also required to be stationary. However, due to a relatively large interval in the
arrival time of poll results and its small sample size (27 observations in this study) and
more importantly that poll respondents are theoretically not meant to consider any other
information than their own voting preference, it is reasonable to assume poll results to
be an exogenous regressor (i.e. poll results are independent to market prices) therefore
their stationary property is not essential.
6.5.1 Property of market price changes
The unit root test in Section 5.4 shows that market prices in seven contracts, except
the Ma¯ori contract, are non-stationary and a I(1) process. This result implies that the
first-period price changes in these contracts are I(0) and therefore stationary. Any test
which requires a regression of the price changes in these contracts should not be subject
to the spurious regression problem. In the Ma¯ori contract, the ADF test rules out the
possibility that its price level is an I(1) process but it does not imply that it is station-
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ary. The visual inspection in Figure 5.2 suggests a time trend of decreasing mean in the
Ma¯ori contract prices, which is a signal of a non-stationary process. The time trend is
eliminated in the first differeence6. The ADF test applied to the first differences of the
Ma¯ori contract shows that its stationarity cannot be rejected.
6.5.2 Alternative models of market price changes
I start with a simple model in which changes in price are determined by solely one factor:
the opinion polls. This simple model excludes any other determinants. Assume that
E(ut|∆Pollt) = 0:
∆pt = α0 + β∆PolltDt + ut (6.6)
where ∆ is the one-period difference; for market prices ∆pt = pt − pt−1 is one-day price
change while for poll results ∆Pollt = Pollt − Pollt−s is the difference of two adjacent
poll reports. Stationarity tests have no power with polls therefore ∆Pollt is treated as
exogenous, i.e. E(ut)|∆PolltDt = 0. Note that while the market price is a continuous
daily time series, poll results arrive at discrete and irregular intervals. For Roy Morgan’s
polls, the time interval are fortnightly on average. This difference in arrival time’s win-
dow is overcome by the dummy variable (Dt) which takes on the value 1 or 0 according
to whether a new poll is released on day t. The regression is estimated by OLS method.
Ideally, polls are meant to be a representative of the voting population then market prices
are expected to perfectly (and positively) correlate with the opinion polls. In the other
words, plimβˆ = 1. However, in reality there always exist measurement errors arising from
the sampling therefore β is never one. The greater the errors, the further β is away from
6Assume the Ma¯ori price is specified by a modelM(p) and the linear time trend pt = M(pt)+τt+ut.
This leads to ∆pt = M(∆pt) + τ [t− (t− 1)] +ut−ut−1 and subsequently ∆pt = M(∆pt) + τ +ut−ut−1
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one. Measurement errors associated with poll results arise in two circumstances. First,
it depends on how well a sample represents the population. Ideally, a sample replicates
all the key properties of the population and at the same time is chosen randomly. The
representativeness comes at the cost of the randomness and the quality of a sample is
determined by how this trade-off is balanced. In practice, no sample achieves a perfect
representativeness and therefore every poll result is associated with a reported margin of
error which depends on the sample size as discussed in Section 6.1. The second source of
measurement errors occurs during the sampling and processing procedure when questions
are not understood correctly by respondents or the responses are not processed properly.
This type of errors is relatively infrequent and can be eliminated by improving the quality
of the sampling and processing procedure.
The robustness of this simple model in Equation (6.6) is examined by checking whether
its residuals are white noise. The three properties of white noise variables namely zero
mean, homoscedasticity and independence (i.e. no serial correlation) are tested by the
t-test, Breusch-Pagan and Box-Ljung test (and Box-Pierce to confirm the results), re-
spectively. At the 5% significance, the simple model in Equation (6.6) violates the white
noise’s assumptions in all eight contracts, except for the Ma¯ori contract. The null hypoth-
esis of homoscedasticity is rejected in two contracts, those for the National and Labour
party and the null hypothesis of independence is rejected in all seven contracts. In the
Ma¯ori contract, the simple model is robust and plausible and both the constant term and
coefficient on the change in polls are not significant at any significance level. The polls
appear not to have any influence on the movement of market prices in the Ma¯ori contract.
The rejection of the white noise hypothesis of residuals in seven out of eight contracts
suggests adding regressors to the simple model in Equation (6.6). The second alternative
model is the autoregressive process where the number of lags are determined by a paring
down process. The ADF test results in Section 5.4 suggests the constant term is small
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and insignificant in all contracts therefore it is excluded in the AR model. The AR(k)
model is as follows:
∆pt = β∆PolltDt +
k∑
j=1
αj∆pt−j + t (6.7)
A specific AR(k) process is determined for individual contract as follows7:
National contract: AR(3)
Labour contract: AR(4)
Green contract: AR(5)
New Zealand First contract: AR(2)
ACT contract: AR(4)
Ma¯ori contract: AR(2) Other contract: AR(3)
United Future contract: AR(5)
The robustness of the autoregressive model is improved slightly as compared to that of
the simple model in Equation (6.6). Residuals in all contracts satisfy the property of
independence while the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is still rejected strongly.
The third alternative model is a moving average process MA(q) in which the number
of lags is determined by a visual inspection of the autocorrelation graphs. The MA(1)
process seems to be appropriate for all contracts, except for the Green and Other contracts
which appear to follow a MA(2) process.
7The number of lags of seven k = 7 is chosen to start with as in the ADF test. The seven lags are
generally large enough to avoid missing significant lags and also consistent with the one week of trading
because iPredict is operating continuously 24/7. The paring down process runs the Equation 6.7 starting
with k = 7 to identify insignificant lags and exclude them. The same procedure runs at k = 6, 5, ... until
all the lags remaining in the equation are all significant.
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In the National, Labour, New Zealand First, ACT, Ma¯ori and United Future contracts:
∆pt = α0 + β∆PolltDt + λ1t−1 + t (6.8a)
In the Green and Other contract:
∆pt = α0 + β∆PolltDt + λ1t−1 + λ2t−2 + t (6.8b)
The moving average model produces robustness in no contract. All contracts violate either
or both of the assumptions of homoscedasticity and independence. Table 6.4 reports the
result of the effect of opinion polls on the movement of market prices examined by the
three models.
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Table 6.4: The immediate effect of opinion polls on market prices
Contract National Labour Green NZ First ACT Ma¯ori Other United
Future
Simple model in Equation (6.6)
β 0.149*** 0.243*** 0.015 0.156** -0.011 -0.005 -0.042 -0.148
(0.043) (0.05) (0.042) (0.058) (0.139) (0.02) (0.109) (0.223)
F-joint ** *** *
AIC -2792.5 -2697.8 -3410.5 -3236.5 -3147.3 -4450.4 -3497.4 -3321.7
R2 0.0288 0.056 0.0003 0.023 0.00001 0.0002 0.0004 0.001
AR(k) process in Equation (6.7)
β 0.128** 0.215*** 0.037 0.161** -0.164 -0.007 0.063 0.13
(0.044) (0.041) (0.035) (0.054) (0.121) (0.019) (0.0888) (0.147)
α1 -0.258*** -0.381*** -0.265*** -0.279*** -0.353*** -0.162* -0.402*** -0.629***
(0.05) (0.052) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
α2 -0.144** -0.218*** -0.267*** -0.127* -0.174*** -0.134. -0.31*** -0.327***
(0.052) (0.055) (0.052) (0.05) (0.052) (0.07) (0.051) (0.059)
α3 -0.146** -0.224*** -0.224*** -0.184*** -0.142** -0.261***
(0.05) (0.054) (0.052) (0.052) (0.049) (0.06)
α4 -0.136* -0.23*** -0.141** -0.108.
(0.053) (0.052) (0.049) (0.06)
α5 -0.146** 0.974*
(0.051) (0.05)
F-joint *** *** *** *** *** * *** ***
AIC -2835.6 -2779.1 -3453.6 -3278.0 -3197.4 -4468.7 -3565.0 -3471.0
R2 0.103 0.184 0.127 0.09 0.126 0.03 0.162 0.31
R2(β = 0) 0.08 0.129 0.124 0.072 0.122 0.03 0.161 0.31
MA(q) in Equation (6.8)
β 0.135*** 0.21*** 0.041 0.157** -0.192 -0.005 -0.03 0.134
(0.04) (0.042) (0.035) (0.053) (0.124) (0.019) (0.083) (0.153)
λ1 -0.295*** -0.441*** -0.294*** -0.316*** -0.396*** -0.192** -0.429*** -0.598***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.048) (0.053) (0.058) (0.096) (0.049) (0.038)
λ2 -0.277*** -0.189***
(0.049) (0.051)
F-joint *** *** *** *** *** * *** ***
AIC -2832.6 -2774.0 -3448.5 -3280.2 -3193.2 -4467.3 -3574.3 -3462.0
R2 0.088 0.163 0.106 0.094 0.106 0.022 0.178 0.284
R2(β = 0) 0.062 0.113 0.103 0.074 0.1 0.022 0.178 0.283
Main table entries are regression coefficient estimates, and entries in parentheses are standard errors.
The joint significance is tested by F-test.
The R2 value is calculated as the square of the correlation coefficient between the actual and modeled data values.
Significant code: 0 ’***’ 0.1% ’**’ 1% ’*’ 5% ’.’ 10% ’ ’ 100%.
In each case the constant term and its standard errors are tiny and insignificant therefore are excluded.
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There are several important points from the results. First, a significant β indicates an
effect of poll results on market prices which consequently implies that information re-
vealed in opinion polls is not anticipated by market participants. This also indicates that
obtaining information contained in polls helps predict the movement of market prices
and one can benefit from exploiting information contained in polls. Consequently, the
finding of a significant β is a signal against the efficiency of the market. In contrast, if
the hypothesis of β = 0 cannot be rejected then information revealed in opinion polls
does not surprise market participants and therefore have already been incorporated into
market prices. The three alternative models do not produce greatly conflicting conclu-
sions. They agree on the sign and significance of the β’s estimate: β is significant in three
contracts of the National, Labour and New Zealand First contract. The magnitude of
β’s estimate varies considerably in the contracts of the Green and ACT party; however
β is insignificant in those cases. The magnitude of β can be interpreted as how much
explanatory power contributed to the movement of market prices by information revealed
in opinion polls, e.g. in the Labour contract, the β of 21.5% in the AR model implies
that 21.5% of the change in prices is driven by the poll’s results. Given that opinion
polls are the major source of information which directly reveal contemporaneous voting
preference, one may expect its effect on market prices to be greater. This result indicates
that either most information contained in polls has been anticipated by traders or traders
discount the credibility of information revealed by polls due to its bias created during the
poll’s sampling or the different purposes and mechanism of opinion polls and the market.
Second, in reality, there are other sources of information other than opinion polls. As
discussed earlier, if polls are the only source of information relevant to the election and
contain no errors then market prices should correlate perfectly with the opinion polls, or
in other words β = 1. When the measurement errors naturally associated with opinion
polls are recognized, the estimate of β remains relatively close to 1 unless the measure-
ment errors are considerably large which eventually raises questions on the credibility of
110
opinion poll results. The empirical results show that β is in fact very small in magnitude
even when it is statistically significant. On the one hand, this can be seen as an evidence
that market traders gather information from many other sources therefore the effect of
opinion polls is attenuated. On the other hand, this may result from the fact that the
measurement error is opinion polls is underestimated or constituted by more than just
the sampling errors. Leigh and Wolfers (2006) suggest in their study of the relative per-
formance of various opinion polls predicting 2004 Australian elections that the margin of
errors reported by pollsters should be doubled. The sampling error is caused by the fact
that the sample interviewed is not the population itself and is dependent on the size of
the sample and the randomness of the sample. However, beside the random sampling,
samples used in opinion polls ar required to be a representative of the population. The
quality of a opinion poll in terms of diminishing the sampling error is determined by
how a sample is chosen so that it can meet both the randomness and representativeness.
Furthermore, error may occur during the interview: it may result from the interviewer’s
misinterpreting questions or failures of memory by respondents (Moon, 1999b).
Third, the F-test for joint significance results in a rejection of the null hypothesis in
which all coefficients are zero in every case. The market efficiency hypothesis states that
the changes in price are random and unpredictable therefore determined by a random
noise. This implies that all the coefficients are zero is the market is efficient. However,
the rejection of the null hypothesis in the majority of cases, especially when the AR and
MA model are in use suggests a degree of predictability.
Fourth, the autoregressive model produces negative coefficients in all contracts at all lags,
except for the lag 2 in the Labour contract. This is consistent with previous studies of
financial markets. Many previous studies have documented the negative correlation in
stock returns over a holding period (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985; Shefrin and Statman,
1985; Long et al., 1990; Bremer and Sweeney, 1991). The predictable trend in stock
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returns is explained by the overreaction of the market which subsequently leads to price
reversal. However, all of these studies rely on transaction prices and are thus unable
to separate the effects of price reversal caused by the overreaction from these caused by
measurement errors in prices. Niederhoffer and Osborne (1966); Roll (1984) show that
within a market using a continuous trading mechanism, the observed security returns will
be negatively correlated due to transaction prices bouncing between bid and ask prices.
Roll (1984) illustrates a simple case where an unobservable "efficient price" follows a ran-
dom walk and transactions only can occur on bid or ask quotes and the assumption is
that the spread is constant and symmetric around the "efficient price". This results in
transaction price changes following a MA(1) process with a negative coefficient. Kaul
and Nimalendran (1990) confirm the main source of price reversals in the short run is the
bid and ask spread and find little evidence of market overreaction. However, in contrast
with Roll (1984)’s finding, they find (also using NASDAQ data) a positive correlation
in stock returns after removing the effect of the bid and ask spread by using bid-to-bid
returns and ask-to-ask returns instead returns derived from transaction prices. Rhee and
Wanga (1997) further show that the patterns in stock returns is caused by two types of
measurement errors: the bid and ask bounce error and the spread size error. Hascrouck
(2007) discusses the Roll’s model in great detail and suggest to use mid-point of bid and
ask spread as a more precise for price estimate while there are suggestions from Blume
and Stambaugh (1983); Keim (1989); Kaul and Nimalendran (1990). This is likely to be
the underlying driver of the negative autocorrelation in the first-order price changes as
shown in Table 6.4.
Fixth, the MA(1) model applied to the series of price changes is consistent with the
theory of "bid and ask bounce" in which the transaction price changes follow a MA(1)
process with a negative coefficient if transactions only can occur at bid or ask orders.
Even though this is only true under the assumption of a constant and symmetric bid and
ask spread around a theoretical "efficient price", the finding of negative coefficients in all
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contracts is consistent with the theory.
Sixth, using AIC as a criteria to find the best fit model, the autoregressive model pro-
duces the most negative values of AIC in all contracts, except for the contract of the New
Zealand First party and the Other contract in which the lowest AIC is achieved by the
moving average model.
Last, R2 represents thee fitness of the model. For instance, in the National contract, R2
is 2.9% in the simple model and is improved up to 10.3% in the AR model; this can be
interpreted that 2.9% of the movement in market price can be explained by the opinion
polls and the additional 6.4% is the result of its own historical price data. The R2 mostly
achieves its highest value in the AR specification but in general the value of R2 is very low
(less than 20% in all cases) and this indicates that all the coefficients that are statistically
significant but may not be sufficient to create a pattern in the movement of market prices
that can be exploited to be used to produce any profitable trading strategy. Additional
information extracted from the R2 in order to determine the influence of opinion polls
is to compare the R2 of the AR and MA models with and without opinion polls, i.e.
β = 0. For instance, R2 is improved by 2.3% when opinion polls are included in the AR
models and by 2.6% in the MA model in the National contract. Across all contracts, R2
values goes up by a very small amount; this implies that opinion polls do not add much
information to help predict market price changes even in cases where the estimate of β
is statistically significant.
The effect of opinion polls when it is statistically significant in the contracts of the
National, Labour and New Zealand First party is questioned for its permanence. Using
an event study, I regress the change on prices from a day before to a day after the poll’s
release on the change in poll’s results to examine whether the effect of a poll’s result persist
for on more day. Results in the simple and AR models as shown in Table 6.5 agree that
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the persistence is present. It then suggests the incorporation of information revealed in
opinion polls remains influential on the price level the day after the poll. The MA model
reveals a completely different story by the lack of significance of β and a near perfect MA
coefficient of 1. This has an implication for the nature of these contracts. Taking the λ1
result and putting this in the Equation (6.8) (using pt+1− pt−1 as a dependent variable),
along with β = 0, means that the price changes for these contracts follow a random walk8
8
The left-hand side: pt+1 − pt−1 = ∆pt+1 + ∆pt
The right-hand side: α0 + t + t−1 = α0 + ∆t
In sum: ∆pt+1 = α0 −∆pt + ∆t
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Table 6.5: The permanence of the opinion polls’ effect in the National, Labour and NZ
First contracts
Contract National Labour NZ First
Simple model: ∆2pt = pt+1 − pt−1 = α0 + β∆PolltDt + ut
β 0.184*** 0.175** 0.217**
(0.053) (0.059) (0.07)
F-joint ** ** **
AIC -2696 -2585 -3080
R2 0.026 0.019 0.02
AR model: ∆2pt = pt+1 − pt−1 = β∆PolltDt +
∑k
j=1 αj∆pt−j + t
β 0.163** 0.194*** 0.186**
(0.051) (0.054) (0.07)
α1 -0.323*** -0.147*** -0.315***
(0.061) (0.06) (0.061)
α2 -0.277*** -0.345*** -0.157*
(0.062) (0.062) (0.063)
α3 -0.18** -0.254*** -0.165**
(0.06) (0.062) (0.063)
α4 -0.071
(0.056)
F-joint *** ** ***
AIC -2648 -2628 -3072
R2 0.113 0.155 0.084
MA model: ∆pt = α0 + β∆PolltDt +
∑q
i=1 λqt−1 + t
β 0.0025 0.0103 -0.0052
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
λ1 ∼ 1*** -0.58** ∼ 1***
(0.0087) (0.057) (0.0076)
λ2 -0.42***
(0.056)
F-joint *** *** ***
AIC -2783 -2738 -3227
R2 0.381 0.35 0.373
Main table entries are regression coefficient estimates, and entries in parentheses are standard errors.
The joint significance is tested by F-test.
The R2 value is calculated as the square of the correlation coefficient between the actual and modeled data values.
Significant code: 0 ’***’ 0.1% ’**’ 1% ’*’ 5% ’.’ 10% ’ ’ 100%.
In each case the constant term and its standard errors are tiny and insignificant therefore are excluded.
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Information is not always incorporated into market prices immediately or as soon as it
becomes available. Or it is also possible that the market anticipates the poll’s result even
before it is reported. This issue is examined in the following test in the conjunction with
the three alternative models discussed above (Equation (6.6) - (6.8)):
∆pt = α0 +β∆PolltDt +β1∆PolltD1t +β2∆PolltD2t +β−1∆PolltD−1t +model+vt (6.9)
where D1t , D2t and D−1t take on the value 1 or 0 according to whether a new poll is released
a day or two days before day t or a day after day t, respectively. A significant estimate
of β1 and β2 and β = 0 indicates a delay in the incorporation of information contained
in polls into market prices, otherwise it is period effect. Whilst inside information of
poll’s results being traded in the market is hinted if β−1 is significant. The regression
is estimated by OLS method and its result is reported in Table 6.4. The three models
produce consistent results. First, the National and Labour contracts show no significant
anticipation or lagged response. Second, no delay in the incorporation of information is
observed, except for in the New Zealand First contract at lag of two days. And last,
trades by anticipating the poll results before they are released publicly is indicated by a
consistently significant estimate of β−1 in contracts of the Green and ACT party. In these
two contracts, the R2 is improved by the additional inside the AR model is 15%, up from
12.7%, i.e. the inside trading contributes 2.3% of explanatory power of the movement
of the market prices. Similarly in the ACT contract, 1.4% of R2 is added by the inside
trading. The overall suggestion is that the market incorporates poll results quickly (on
the day).
It is difficult to model robustly and in order to do this, it may require a more complex
model beyond the scope of this study. Overall, although none of the models are suffi-
ciently robust to provide confidence that the price change process is adequately modelled,
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there is a degree of consistency in the results with regards to β. There is mixed evidence
as to the effect of opinion polls: the National, Labour and New Zealand First contract
prices are affected by polls but to a very small degree while there is no effect of polls
on prices of the rest of the contracts. The event studies conflict is that the simple and
extended versions point to polls having a permanent effect in those contacts where the
immediate effect of polls is found in contrast the MA version suggesting not only is there
no permanence effect, but also the MA model collapse to a random walk.
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Table 6.6: The ex-ante and ex-post effect of opinion polls on market prices
Contract National Labour Green NZ First ACT Ma¯ori Other United
Future
Simple model: Equation (6.6) and Equation (6.9)
β 0.149*** 0.242*** 0.015 0.156** -0.011 -0.005 -0.043 -0.148
(0.043) (0.05) (0.041) (0.058) (0.139) (0.02) (0.109) (0.223)
β1 0.035 -0.067 -0.051 0.062 -0.123 -0.020 0.064 0.333
(0.043) (0.05) (0.041) (0.058) (0.139) (0.02) (0.109) (0.223)
β2 -0.029 -0.037 -0.012 0.14* -0.059 -0.016 0.022 0.184
(0.043) (0.05) (0.041) (0.058) (0.139) (0.02) (0.109) (0.223)
β−1 -0.068 -0.011 0.135** -0.095 -0.307* 0.018 -0.2901** 0.199
(0.043) (0.05) (0.041) (0.058) (0.139) (0.02) (0.109) (0.223)
F-joint ** *** * **
AIC -2807.4 -2725.4 -3415.8 -3253.7 -3151.1 -4457.3 -3501.7 -3328.4
R2 0.037 0.062 0.03 0.041 0.014 0.006 0.019 0.01
AR(k) process: Equation (6.7) and Equation (6.9)
β 0.143*** 0.244*** 0.016 0.155** 0.017 -0.006 -0.009 -0.136
(0.042) (0.049) (0.040) (0.057) (0.137) (0.019) (0.107) (0.214)
β1 0.032 -0.057 -0.048 0.065 -0.138 -0.016 0.041 0.320
(0.042) (0.05) (0.039) (0.057) (0.136) (0.02) (0.107) (0.215)
β2 -0.035 -0.039 -0.022 0.129* -0.026 -0.014 0.004 0.028
(0.041) (0.046) (0.038) (0.055) (0.129) (0.019) (0.099) (0.182)
β−1 -0.066 0.011 0.1235** -0.095. -0.305* 0.015 -0.168. 0.115
(0.041) (0.046) (0.039) (0.055) (0.129) (0.019) (0.10) (0.182)
α1 -0.258*** -0.387*** -0.27*** -0.293*** -0.354*** -0.155** -0.391*** -0.628***
(0.05) (0.053) (0.050) (0.05) (0.049) (0.055) (0.050) (0.05)
α2 -0.138** -0.224*** -0.258*** -0.12* -0.179*** -0.122* -0.302*** -0.329***
(0.052) (0.055) (0.052) (0.050) (0.052) (0.055) (0.052) (0.059)
α3 -0.1452** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.181*** -0.137** -0.254***
(0.051) (0.055) (0.052) (0.052) (0.050) (0.060)
α4 -0.128* -0.228*** -0.149** -0.107.
(0.054) (0.052) (0.050) (0.059)
α5 -0.127* 0.099*
(0.052) (0.050)
F-joint *** *** *** *** *** * *** ***
AIC -2833.3 -2776.3 -3458.4 -3283.9 -3199.0 -4464.6 -3561.8 -3468.8
R2 0.111 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.034 0.17 0.32
MA(q): Equation (6.8) and Equation (6.9)
β 0.149*** 0.248*** 0.015 0.156** -0.011 -0.006 -0.043 -0.148
(0.042) (0.05) (0.042) (0.058) (0.140) (0.020) (0.112) (0.218)
β1 0.035 -0.068 -0.051 0.061 -0.123 -0.017 0.065 0.334
(0.043) (0.05) (0.042) (0.058) (0.140) (0.020) (0.112) (0.218)
β2 -0.043 -0.033 -0.015 0.13* -0.014 -0.013 0.017 0.092
(0.043) (0.046) (0.040) (0.055) (0.131) (0.019) (0.100) (0.187)
β−1 -0.068 0.011 0.142*** -0.096. -0.329* 0.015 -0.148 0.085
(0.042) (0.046) (0.040) (0.055) (0.130) (0.019) (0.101) (0.187)
λ1 -0.296*** -0.4*** 0.285*** -0.32*** -0.396*** -0.16** -0.506*** -0.598***
(0.058) (0.051) (0.068) (0.052) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.038)
λ2 -0.127* -0.101.
(0.05) (0.057)
F-joint *** *** *** *** *** * *** ***
AIC -2830.6 -2772.2 -3432.5 -3286.2 -3194.5 -4463.6 -3560.2 -3460.7
R2 0.097 0.183 0.077 0.12 0.12 0.035 0.16 0.29
Main table entries are regression coefficient estimates, and entries in parentheses are standard errors.
The joint significance is tested by F-test.
The R2 value is calculated as the square of the correlation coefficient between the actual and modeled data values.
Significant code: 0 ’***’ 0.1% ’**’ 1% ’*’ 5% ’.’ 10% ’ ’ 100%.
In each case the constant term and its standard errors are tiny and insignificant therefore are excluded.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Efficiency reflects the speed and extent to which markets incorporate and reflect new
information. Typically, studies of efficiency look to test whether the price data could be
explained by a random walk model. Given that such models suggest that future prices
cannot be predicted, a good fit suggests that there is no systematic way of generating
abnormal returns and thus the market is efficient. This absence of abnormal profits in-
cludes an absence of arbitrage profits. Thus one way to test for inefficiency is to look
for arbitrage opportunities. In other words, few or no significant arbitrage opportunities
would be consistent with market efficiency. Many or large such opportunities suggest
that the market is inefficient and that abnormal profits may be made.
Prediction markets are unique in that they will often provide bundles of contracts on the
same event that are mutually exclusive in that their aggregate payout will always sum to
$1 or a 100% probability. This provides an opportunity to test whether the market is ef-
ficient because of the absence of risk-free (or negligible risk) profit-making opportunities,
i.e. there are no arbitrage opportunities. There have been few detailed studies of arbi-
trage in prediction markets although some studies have briefly noted a lack of arbitrage
opportunities.
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I examine the iPredict party vote contracts for the 2011 General Election and find that
even before transaction costs were introduced, almost all the arbitrage opportunities that
arose gave returns less than the relevant risk-free rate. The mean arbitrage profit (tak-
ing into account the bid and ask spread) was 0.21 cents per bundle trade (which must
have a payoff of $1). Around 22% of the daily (last traded) prices met the conditions
for arbitrage. Thus, in line with the literature, I find that while arbitrage opportunities
are not uncommon in the iPredict markets, they remain relatively small and insufficient
to provide abnormal returns. After the introduction of transaction costs, the scope for
profitable arbitrage is further reduced. This lack of persistent and significant arbitrage
opportunities suggests that the iPredict party vote contract markets are efficient (at least
in the semi-strong form).
Although random walk models are by their nature non-stationary, in order to run em-
pirical tests on prediction market data, it is necessary to ensure that the testing is not
subject to spurious regression. None of the literature in prediction markets to date has
addressed this issue even though the typical finding is that market prices follow a random
walk (and are therefore implicitly non-stationary). Examining the iPredict data, I find
that 7 of the 8 party vote contracts for the 2011 General Election are non-stationary,
meaning that the data must be transformed for standard regressions to avoid the spuri-
ous regression issue.
In line with other studies, I find that the iPredict prices are generally more accurate than
the opinion polls in the comparison of forecast errors. This suggests that the information
contained in the market prices is to some extent better than opinion polls for prediction
of the electoral outcome. In order to examine whether opinion polls have any influence on
iPredict prices, I use the first difference of market price data and construct three types of
model namely a simple model in which the opinion poll is the only explanatory variable,
an autoregressive model in which the price change is assumed to be serially correlated
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and a moving average model. The autoregressive models are derived from the stationarity
tests (dropping the lagged price level because of its insignificance) and with the number
of lagged price changes determined by a paring down process. The empirical results show
that opinion polls have a consistently significant effect on the National, Labour and New
Zealand First prices. Prices in these contracts not only react to the opinion poll on the
day of its release day but that reaction persists until the a day after. The event studies
examine the ex-ante and ex-post effect of opinion polls to see if markets anticipated or
reacted with a delay in incorporating poll information and show that no contracts show
significant anticipation, except for the Green and ACT contracts and the lagged response
at two day later is present in the New Zealand First contract. However, these effect
of anticipation and lagged responses of poll information do not contribute considerably
more to the R2. If the addition of the polling data does not significantly increase R2
which represents the explanatory power of the variables then the implication is that the
polling data has little additional ability to explain the movement in market prices. This
is consistent with markets being efficient in that the additional information may already
be largely incorporated into trading behaviour.
The fact that the various models I have used have little explanatory power is consistent
with the hypothesis that the iPredict markets are efficient. One possible avenue for
further research is to incorporate other polls (and thus also increasing the number of
observations). The effect of the polls may be understated due to the fact that I have
used data only from one polling company which provides me with a set of polling data
consisting of solely 27 observations. Furthermore, the information contained in individual
pollsters’ poll results may be biased due to their particular polling technique. Polls are
subject to sampling error so even if opinion polls reveal information that has not been
anticipated by market participants, that information has to be sufficiently distinct after
being discounted by the sampling error so that it will affect market prices.
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